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Resurrecting Trial by Statistics 
Jay Tidmarsh† 
Always more popular among academics than among courts, 
trial by statistics died on June 20, 2011. On that day, in an 
opinion closely divided in other regards, the Supreme Court 
unanimously “disapprove[d] that novel project.”1 The notion 
that a court could try a representative sample of monetary 
claims and extrapolate the average result to the remainder of 
the cases was finished. 
The demise of trial by statistics is a significant matter for 
class actions and other aggregate litigation. Most obviously, 
removing this method for determining damages limits the abil-
ity of a court to adjudicate a mass dispute should the cases 
come to trial. Consider a class action with 200 members, each 
cheated out of a different sum of money by a defendant’s wrong. 
Unless a judge can employ some simple way to determine how 
much each class member has lost,2 the judge must preside over 
200 separate trials. Granted, the trials can be limited just to 
damages; liability can be resolved on an aggregate basis. But 
200 damages trials are still 200 trials. That number may not 
seem too bad, and it probably isn’t. But what if there are 20,000 
victims? Few judges would want to take on that herculean task, 
and none could complete it. Trial by statistics allows the judge 
 
 † Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I thank Ed Cheng, Alexan-
dra Lahav, Teddy Rave, and David Rosenberg for their comments on drafts of 
this Article. I also thank Tony Carucci and Clarence Wilson for research assis-
tance. Copyright © 2015 by Jay Tidmarsh. 
 1. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011). In Wal-
Mart the Court referred to trial by statistics as “Trial by Formula.” Id. 
 2. On occasion, a simple method exists. See Leyva v. Medline Indus., 
Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 2013) (reversing a denial of class certification 
when the defendant’s “computerized payroll and time-keeping database would 
enable the court to accurately calculate damages and related penalties for 
each claim”); Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 40–41 (1st Cir. 
2003) (reversing a denial of class certification when a computer program could 
calculate awards to cell-phone users allegedly overcharged for incoming calls). 
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to hear just a fraction of the total number of cases, making the 
resolution of mass disputes with varying amounts of individual 
damages a realistic possibility. 
The reason that the Supreme Court’s disapproval of trial 
by statistics matters, however, is not the efficient conduct of 
trial. Virtually every civil case settles,3 and class actions or oth-
er aggregate litigation are not exceptions to the rule.4 The real 
battle—the one that determines the value of the settlement—is 
whether the cases are aggregated in the first place.5 In a class 
action seeking damages, class certification usually requires the 
putative class representative to prove, among other things, that 
common issues among class members predominate and that the 
class action is superior to other methods for resolving the dis-
pute.6 The individuality of the damages awards may defeat a 
 
 3. In the most recent year for which statistics are available, 1.2% of civil 
cases filed in federal court went to trial. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR ON THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl.C-4 (2013). The rate was the same during 
the prior year, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE DIRECTOR ON THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 
tbl.C-4 (2012), and is a tick up from 2011 (1.1%), see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. COURTS, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR ON THE JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl.C-4 (2011). These numbers are 
generally consistent with the long-term decline in American trials. See, e.g., 
Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years of 
War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (2005) (discussing “a long-term and gradual 
decline in the portion of cases that terminate in trial and a steep drop in the 
absolute number of trials during the past twenty years”). 
 4. See Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of 
Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 591, 606–07 (2006) (noting that, in an empirical study of state 
and federal class actions, every class action that had been certified and had 
terminated before the end of the study had settled); cf. VINCE MORABITO, 
AUSTL. RESEARCH COUNCIL, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF AUSTRALIA’S CLASS 
ACTION REGIMES: SECOND REPORT 5 (2010) (finding that approximately 41% 
of class actions resolved under Australia’s new class-action rules had settled, 
but that 100% of the resolved class actions that had been funded by third par-
ties had settled). 
 5. See Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled 
Law: Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1839, 1861 (2006) (“It is well understood that aggregation is the key to the vi-
ability of many claims routinely brought as class actions, particularly what are 
termed the negative value claims, in which the transaction costs of prosecut-
ing individual actions make enforcement impossible absent aggregation.”). 
 6. In federal court, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 specifies the con-
ditions under which a class action may go forward. In addition to meeting all 
of the criteria found in Rules 23(a) and (g), a class must also meet one of the 
four conditions specified in Rules 23(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2), or (b)(3). Rule 
23(b)(1)(A) is rarely used for damage claims. See In re Dennis Greenman Sec. 
Litig., 829 F.2d 1539, 1545 (11th Cir. 1987). Rule 23(b)(1)(B) can involve 
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finding of predominance,7 and also puts a finding of superiority 
into jeopardy—for the simple reason that a case requiring 
20,000 damages hearings is unlikely to be seen as a superior 
way to resolve a dispute. Increasingly, courts have required a 
putative class representative to submit a “trial plan” detailing 
how the case would be tried if it were certified.8 If the plaintiff 
cannot provide a workable plan to try individual damages, a 
court might deny class certification.9 
This is the point at which trial by statistics was often use-
ful. Only three reported federal cases used trial by statistics to 
determine damages, and two of them were reversed on appeal.10 
 
claims for damages against a limited fund, but the criteria apply to very few 
monetary claims. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832–41 (1999). 
Rule 23(b)(2) categorically forbids virtually any claims for monetary relief. See 
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557–61. But see id. at 2560 (suggesting one modest 
potential exception to this bar). That leaves Rule 23(b)(3) as the likely source 
of authority for a court contemplating the certification of a class action seeking 
money. See id. at 2558 (noting that “individualized monetary claims belong in 
Rule 23(b)(3)”). Rule 23(b)(3) has two criteria: that “the questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only indi-
vidual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods 
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” 
 7. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013) (holding 
that when the plaintiffs’ methodology failed to measure damages on a class-
wide basis, predominance was not satisfied because “[q]uestions of individual 
damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions common to the 
class”); Ward v. Dixie Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 595 F.3d 164, 180 (4th Cir. 2010) (“To 
be sure, individualized damage determinations cut against class certification 
under Rule 23(b)(3).”). But see Smilow, 323 F.3d at 40 (“The individuation of 
damages in consumer class actions is rarely determinative under Rule 
23(b)(3).”).  
 8. See Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900, 905 (7th Cir. 2012) (not-
ing that “courts’ increased use of class-action trial plans” is due to “the ‘critical 
need . . . to determine how the case will be tried’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 
advisory committee’s note (2003))), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1722 
(2013); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.756 (2004) [herein-
after MANUAL, FOURTH] (“A trial plan . . . will help determine whether a trial 
will be manageable and meet all the Rule 23 certification standards.”); id. 
§ 22.93 (“Judges often require the parties to submit detailed trial plans early 
in the case and to modify the plans as the case develops.”). 
 9. See Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d 770, 773, 777 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (affirming the decertification of a class action when the plaintiffs 
failed to offer a trial plan that could feasibly determine damages for 2341 class 
members). 
 10. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 178 F. 
Supp. 2d 198, 247–62 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), rev’d in part on other grounds and 
questions certified, 344 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2003) (Blue Cross I), questions an-
swered, Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 818 
N.E.2d 1140 (N.Y. 2004) (Blue Cross II), rev’d, Empire Healthchoice, Inc. v. 
Philip Morris USA Inc., 393 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2004); In re Estate of Ferdinand 
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But in a number of other cases putative class counsel put a tri-
al-by-statistics approach into the trial plan, and the court then 
found that the class action was manageable enough to merit 
certification.11 At least one of these cases trundled along toward 
 
E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1462 (D. Haw. 1995), aff’d 
sub nom. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996); Cimino v. 
Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 653 (E.D. Tex. 1990), rev’d in part, 
151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998). In Blue Cross I, the Second Circuit approved of 
the use of a trial-by-statistics approach to determining damages but certified 
the question to the New York Court of Appeals. Blue Cross I, 344 F.3d at 225–
29. The New York Court of Appeals did not address the question, finding that 
the claim against the defendant failed on other grounds. Blue Cross II, 818 
N.E.2d at 1146. As a result, the Second Circuit reversed the trial verdict on 
grounds unrelated to the use of trial by statistics. Empire, 393 F.3d 312. The 
Second Circuit ultimately took a negative view of trial by statistics in 
McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231 (2d Cir. 2008). 
The First Circuit also affirmed the use of an aggregate-damage approach 
that had some elements of trial by statistics; the district court awarded dam-
ages based on the aggregate harm suffered by the class (calculable as the dif-
ference in price between the actual and the fair market prices for certain 
drugs) rather than the amount of injury to each class member. See In re 
Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 582 F.3d 156, 162, 195–98 (1st 
Cir. 2009); cf. In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(approving the concept of sampling, but finding that the chosen plan was de-
fective due to the failure to use a random sample). 
The reception of state courts to trial by statistics has been similarly luke-
warm. See, e.g., Leverence v. PFS Corp., 532 N.W.2d 735, 739 (Wis. 1995) 
(“[T]he aggregative procedure cannot be used, as it was here, in place of a 
party’s right to a trial . . . .”); Scottsdale Mem’l Health Sys., Inc. v. Maricopa 
Cnty., 228 P.3d 117, 120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (permitting the use of statistical 
evidence to prove damages in some circumstances but holding that the trial 
court had failed to find that these circumstances existed). 
 11. The trial plans often called for dividing the cases into stages, with lia-
bility determined in a first stage and damages in a later stage. See In re 
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 69, 188–91 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), rev’d on 
other grounds sub nom. UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121 (2d 
Cir. 2010); Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 178 (N.D. Cal. 
2004) (approving a trial plan involving a first-stage liability phase and a se-
cond-stage formula process for determining backpay awards, even though the 
plaintiffs’ briefs addressed the formula process only in the “most conclusory 
terms”), aff’d, 603 F.3d 571, 625 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (noting that “a range 
of possibilities,” including trial by statistics, could make the case manageable), 
rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 100 
(E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated on other grounds, 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005); In re 
Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 125, 139–40 (declining to rule on the propriety of us-
ing trial by statistics); see also Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014, 1017–20 
(5th Cir. 1992) (affirming class certification when trial plan included a Phase 
III trial of claims in small groups and using the results from these groups to 
“facilitate settlements”). But see Augustin v. Jablonsky, 819 F. Supp. 2d 153, 
169–73 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting a trial-by-statistics plan); Arch v. Am. To-
bacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 493–94 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (rejecting a plan with bifur-
cation and trial-by-statistics elements). 
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a settlement that obviated the need for actually using trial by 
statistics.12 In other words, the prospect of trial by statistics fa-
cilitated aggregation. Wal-Mart’s rejection of trial by statistics 
makes mass aggregation that much more difficult to achieve 
due to the lack of good alternatives for trying mass damages.13 
I come neither to praise trial by statistics nor to bury it. 
Part I of this Article shows that strong arguments favor trial by 
statistics, but equally compelling arguments lie on the other 
 
The wavering enthusiasm for a trial-by-statistics approach can also be 
seen in the Manual for Complex Litigation. In 1995, the third edition of the 
Manual endorsed, as one trial option, a trial-by-statistics plan not unlike the 
Marcos plan. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 33.28 (1995). By 
the next edition in 2004, the Manual had backed off this position, noting only 
that a trial-by-statistics plan was possible “[a]lthough not accepted as main-
stream.” MANUAL, FOURTH, supra note 8, § 21.5. 
 12. After the decision in Watson, 979 F.2d 1014, the parties reportedly 
settled while a petition for rehearing was pending. Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 53 
F.3d 663, 664 (5th Cir. 1994) (dismissing appeal); MANUAL, FOURTH, supra 
note 8, § 22.756 n.1401 (noting that the case settled). 
 13. Principal among the other tools for trying aggregated cases are bell-
wether trials, in which the court tries a small number of cases to generate 
enough information about claim value for the parties to forge a settlement, 
and cy pres relief, in which recoveries that cannot be feasibly provided to vic-
tims are instead given to a non-profit group whose interests roughly align with 
the victims’ interests. On bellwether trials, see generally Eldon E. Fallon et 
al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323 (2008); 
Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576 (2008) 
[hereinafter Lahav, Bellwether Trials]. On cy pres, see, for example, In re Baby 
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 2013) (“When excess settle-
ment funds remain after claimants have received the distribution they are en-
titled to under the terms of the settlement agreement, there are three princi-
pal options for distributing the remaining funds—reversion to the defendant, 
escheat to the state, or distribution of the funds cy pres.”); AM. LAW INST., 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07(b) (2010) (recom-
mending the use of cy pres when individual damages distributions are not 
“economically viable” or are otherwise “impossible or unfair”). One problem 
with bellwether trials, which are most useful in positive-value cases, is that a 
court cannot use the method to resolve large numbers of cases; it must hope 
that a settlement—in which recoveries are negotiated rather than adjudicat-
ed—can be substituted for trial of all the claims. Cf. Alexandra D. Lahav, The 
Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 610–12 (2012) [hereinafter 
Lahav, Trial by Formula] (describing cases in which bellwether plaintiffs were 
used to forge an aggregate settlement). One problem with cy pres, which is 
most useful in negative-value cases, is that it may result in no recovery for vic-
tims—an even worse result for victims than the admittedly imperfect average 
award of trial by statistics. 
For other approaches for trying a mass number of claims, none of which is 
a realistic panacea in most cases seeking individualized damages, see In re 
Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2001), 
overruled on other grounds by In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 
24, 40 (2d Cir. 2006); MANUAL, FOURTH, supra note 8, § 22.93. 
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side. Whatever its abstract merits, trial by statistics was ulti-
mately doomed to die because it suffered from a fatal disease: it 
failed to allow the parties to submit individualized proof not on-
ly on the amount of injury but also—and this was the especially 
damning part—on the fact of injury. Courts were unwilling to 
trade their long-standing insistence on proof of individual cau-
sation for the new-fangled proof of aggregated and averaged in-
jury, regardless of how much simpler it was to adjudicate the 
latter issue. 
That fact does not mean that trial by statistics in all forms 
should be abandoned. Part II suggests a modified trial-by-
statistics approach that reaps many of the benefits of trial by 
statistics, minimizes its costs, and satisfies Wal-Mart’s critique. 
The solution is to make the average award—as determined in a 
trial-by-statistics process—the presumptive award for each 
class member. The court must enter judgment for this amount 
in each case unless a party rebuts the presumption with indi-
vidualized proof of damages. 
Unlike trial by statistics, a presumptive-judgment ap-
proach gives the parties the power to contest both the fact and 
the quantum of injury. As Part II explains, however, a party 
has no incentive to do so unless the party can expect a better 
outcome after factoring in the costs of individual litigation. In 
many cases, no party will contest the presumptive judgment. In 
some situations, however, at least one party expects a better 
outcome from an individual trial, and therefore has an incen-
tive to reject the presumptive award. Part II explores ways to 
limit this incentive and thus to reduce significantly the likeli-
hood of individual trials. Although using presumptive judg-
ments is not a panacea for all aggregated proceedings involving 
individualized damages, this modified trial-by-statistics ap-
proach provides a new and useful technique to resolve a large 
swath of complex cases. 
I.  THE PROS AND CONS OF TRIAL BY STATISTICS   
The idea behind trial by statistics is to extrapolate the re-
sults from a sample of cases to a broader group of claims. The 
sample, which is randomly selected from within the group, 
must be of a sufficient size for the court to assume (to a speci-
fied level of confidence) that the sample accurately reflects the 
broader population.14 The results achieved in the sample trials 
 
 14. For a description of the process, see Michael J. Saks & Peter David 
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(including defense verdicts) are then averaged, and the average 
award is given to the unsampled members of the group.15 
For example, assume a group of a hundred claims. From 
this group, a court would randomly select a sample of sufficient 
size that the court would have a strong assurance that the 
sample possesses the same characteristics as the larger group 
of claims. Let’s say that this sample size is ten. The jury tries 
these ten claims to conclusion. Assume that the jury returns a 
defense verdict in one case, but also finds that five victims were 
injured in the amount of $10,000 and four in the amount of 
$25,000. Thus, the total amount awarded is $150,000. The av-
erage of the ten claims is $15,000, which is the amount that 
each of the ninety unsampled claimants would receive.16 
There are numerous benefits to this approach, but also 
some significant drawbacks. 
A. THE BENEFITS 
Trial by statistics possesses a number of positive features. 
The first is better deterrence. If the sampling is done well, the 
court obtains a good sense of the size of the harm that the de-
fendant has caused, and can extrapolate from the sample to en-
sure that the defendant is held responsible for that amount of 
harm—no more and no less. Thus, defendants will internalize 
the costs of their behavior, and will be neither underdeterred 
 
Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and 
Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 841–51 (1992). 
 15. Although the average award could be given to the individuals who 
compose the sample, the courts that have used trial by statistics have awarded 
the damages determined by the jury to claimants in the sample. See Hilao, 103 
F.3d at 783–84 & n.9; Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653. This approach may limit 
the sample’s incentive to invest optimally in damages issues, thus reducing 
the accuracy of the sample. See Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: 
Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 
561, 587–93 (1993). 
 16. I choose these numbers for the sake of simplicity. If sampling actually 
yielded the results described in the text, the methodology might be suspect: 
the court should probably have sampled the low-value ($10,000) claims and 
high-value ($25,000) claims separately. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 14, at 
844–47. In the example, I also compute the average as the arithmetic mean of 
the individual judgments. I discuss other ways to determine the average infra 
notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
Although I describe the trial-by-statistics process in terms of jury verdicts, 
I assume that the verdicts are subject to appeal and that the post-appeal val-
ues of those verdicts are used in calculating the average award. Thus, if the 
court of appeals reversed one of the nine plaintiff verdicts, the average would 
be computed with this case treated as a defense verdict. 
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nor overdeterred.17 The proper internalization of costs is espe-
cially important when the lack of trial by statistics would lead 
a court to deny the aggregation of claims due to the lack of an 
effective means for providing redress.18 Wrongdoers in such sit-
uations often would go undeterred. 
Second, the process is less costly than one-by-one trials. In 
the hypothetical above, the court can dispense with ninety tri-
als, with all their attendant costs.19 From these gains must be 
deducted the trial costs of any of the sampled cases that—due 
to their weakness or small value—would never have been tried 
 
 17. On the importance of actors internalizing the costs of their actions, see 
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 144, 174–78 (1970). See also 
Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 
346 n.97 (2012) (“If one is truly committed to welfare maximization, one must 
ensure that potential injurers internalize the costs of negligent conduct.”). For 
applications of this principle to trial by statistics, see Bone, supra note 15, at 
595–98 (positing the argument before critiquing it from rights-based and proc-
ess-based perspectives); Saks & Blanck, supra note 14, at 829–30 (analyzing 
the deterrence argument in terms of due process). 
Professor Kaplow makes a different deterrence argument. Investigating 
the circumstances in which an accurate determination of damages is socially 
beneficial, he demonstrates that awarding the average amount of damages 
makes sense when defendants, “at the time they decide how to act, know only 
the average level of harm for the type of act they will commit but not the actu-
al harm their act will cause.” Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudi-
cation: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 313 (1994). In this 
situation, insisting on “greater precision ex post, in adjudication, is a waste of 
resources because information learned later cannot improve the earlier deci-
sion”; incurring the expense of proving individual damages is socially harmful 
because it has no deterrent effect and it costs more than providing an average 
award. Id. at 313–14. When a defendant can know ex ante the actual harm it 
will cause, then greater accuracy in damages is beneficial if the actual level of 
damages influences a defendant’s decision whether to take care and if the cost 
of determining damages is less than the gains achieved by the change in be-
havior. Id. at 314–15; see id. at 315 (“[A]ccuracy will be valuable when it is 
cheap and the effect on use of the substance would involve substantial bene-
fits.”). For cases in which actual damages should be calculated, Professor Kap-
low does not address which method of determining actual harm—the question 
at the heart of the trial-by-statistics debate—is best. 
 18. See supra notes 6–13 and accompanying text. 
 19. In the Cimino litigation, Judge Parker tried 169 sample cases, 160 of 
which required a determination of damages, before extrapolating the results to 
another 2220 cases. Trying the 160 damages cases took 133 days of trial time, 
with four judges, three magistrate judges, and two juries engaged in the proc-
ess. See Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653 (“If all that is accomplished by this [trial 
process] is the closing of 169 cases, then it was not worth the effort and will 
not be repeated.”). A method even less expensive than trial by statistics would 
be to survey the sample rather than to conduct trials and to put the results of 
the surveys before the factfinder. See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, 
Sampling Damages, 83 IOWA L. REV. 545, 554–56 (1998) (proposing such sur-
veys). No court has taken this additional step. 
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individually. With the small-value cases, however, the first ar-
gument loops back in: without a cost-effective method for decid-
ing these cases, defendants could cause small-value harms on a 
large scale with impunity.20 
Third, under certain conditions trial by statistics can en-
hance accuracy—a positive feature both for those who believe 
that legal process should be as efficient as possible21 and for 
those who believe that procedure’s role is to enforce substantive 
rights as perfectly as possible.22 Most evidently, trial by statis-
tics can smooth out aberrational jury awards in individual cas-
es.23 Of course, enhanced accuracy is not a guarantee; it de-
pends on a number of factors, including a homogenous and 
randomly selected sample of proper size,24 equal incentives for 
 
 20. The argument in the text is essentially economic. It is possible to de-
velop a process-based argument along the same lines. Although the day-in-
court ideal generally disfavors the use of trial by statistics, see infra notes 40–
41 and accompanying text, the scarcity of judicial resources and the costliness 
of individual litigation can legitimate trial by statistics as a matter of proce-
dural fairness, see Robert G. Bone, A Normative Evaluation of Actuarial Liti-
gation, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 227, 256–59 (2011) (refining the process-based ar-
gument originally made in Bone, supra note 15, at 628–50). 
 21. From an economic viewpoint, the law should minimize the sum of 
harm, preventing harm, and transaction costs such as the cost of litigation. 
See CALABRESI, supra note 17, at 26–31. Although this objective does not nec-
essarily require that litigation costs be kept to their minimum, doing so is 
usually regarded as an important goal. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.1 (7th ed. 2007). Litigation costs are composed of two 
elements: the direct costs of litigation (attorney’s fees, expenses, and the like) 
and the costs of errors. Id. As a rule, there is a trade-off between accuracy and 
litigation expenditures; with trial by statistics, however, the arguably more 
accurate process, see infra note 23 and accompanying text, is also cheaper, see 
supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 22. See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemak-
ing, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 934 
(1999). 
 23. See Edward K. Cheng, When 10 Trials Are Better Than 1000: An Evi-
dentiary Perspective on Trial Sampling, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 957 (2012) 
(“Given the right conditions, sampling can actually produce more accurate 
outcomes than individualized adjudication.”); Saks & Blanck, supra note 14, at 
835 (“By awarding that same amount to each of the remaining . . . plaintiffs, 
the court also does better, in terms of accuracy of award, than it would if it 
conducted . . . individualized trials.”). 
 24. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 14, at 844–47; cf. Cheng, supra note 23, 
at 963–65 (arguing that in some situations non-random sampling of extreme 
cases can provide an accurate estimate of total damages). One of the chal-
lenges in a trial-by-statistics plan is defining the group from which the sample 
is drawn. In Hilao and Cimino, the groups were known; they were composed of 
plaintiffs who had submitted claims or filed suit. See In re Estate of Ferdinand 
E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1462 & n.1 (D. Haw. 
1995), aff’d sub nom. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996); 
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the plaintiffs and the defendants to invest in the sample tri-
als,25 and a lack of bias by the factfinder.26 At the same time, it 
is important to understand the nature of the accuracy argu-
ment. “Accuracy” does not mean that each and every claimant 
receives exactly the right amount; indeed, the likelihood is high 
that, when claimants’ injuries are variable, the average recov-
ery will provide some claimants with too much recovery and 
others with too little.27 Even if it does not increase the accuracy 
of individual awards,28 however, trial by statistics may do a bet-
ter job of determining the aggregate liability of the defendant—
a fact that again loops back to the first argument on deterrence. 
Fourth, in some cases trial by statistics ensures a modicum 
of compensation to victims when no other method would be as 
adequate and timely. For instance, in the absence of a plan to 
 
Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 652. In some class actions, the exact membership of 
the class may not be known, thus making the process of selecting a random 
sample more difficult. The difficulty is somewhat lessened by the doctrine 
that, when class membership is truly impossible to ascertain, a class action 
should not be certified. See Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 
(3d Cir. 2012) (“If class members are impossible to identify without extensive 
and individualized fact-finding or ‘mini-trials,’ then a class action is inappro-
priate.”). 
 25. See Bone, supra note 15, at 588–93; cf. David Rosenberg, Mandatory-
Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 831, 847–53 (2002) (arguing that a mandatory class action is necessary 
in order to equalize investment incentives between mass-tort plaintiffs and 
defendants). 
 26. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 14, at 847–50. 
 27. See Bone, supra note 15, at 579–84 (demonstrating that in many trial-
by-statistics plans, a large number of the claimants who receive the average 
award will not receive an award that precisely compensates them for their 
losses). 
 28. Indeed, for reasons unrelated to trial by statistics, the process of ag-
gregation itself can change the value of claims. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Ken-
neth S. Bordens, The Consolidation of Plaintiffs: The Effects of Number of 
Plaintiffs on Jurors’ Liability Decisions, Damage Awards, and Cognitive Pro-
cessing of Evidence, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 909, 914, 916 (2000) (reporting 
experimental data showing that the likelihood of recovery increases as more 
plaintiffs are aggregated but that the average damages award decreases if 
more than four plaintiffs are aggregated); Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. 
Bordens, The Effects of Outlier Presence, Plaintiff Population Size, and Aggre-
gation of Plaintiffs on Simulated Civil Jury Decisions, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
209, 225–26 (1988) (reporting experimental data showing that the aggregation 
of claims increases the likelihood of recovery on weak claims but suppresses 
the value of strong claims, and that experimental juries were told of the pres-
ence of other similar victims). Aggregation may also create a litigation “premi-
um,” partly because a defendant can settle all claims and buy global peace and 
partly because a risk-averse defendant will not want to try a massive case 
with potentially ruinous financial consequences. Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 
F.3d 273, 339 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J., concurring). 
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distribute damages, a court may decline to aggregate the 
claims,29 leaving victims with no remedy. Or a court may opt for 
another remedial alternative, like cy pres relief, that extracts a 
payment from the defendant but still leaves the victims with no 
remedy.30 Even aggregate settlements usually result in imper-
fect compensation, because the structures used to award com-
pensation often resemble administrative schemes in which an 
award hinges more on a few generic factors than on a victim’s 
unique situation.31 In a world of imperfect solutions, sometimes 
half a loaf is better than none—regardless of whether a victim’s 
“true” entitlement is a quarter of a loaf or three-quarters.32 
The first four arguments are essentially instrumental in 
nature: they justify trial by statistics in terms of an improved 
quality of outcome. But trial by statistics also advances certain 
non-instrumental process values. Principal among these is 
equality: the process has the potential to achieve the like 
treatment of like cases, which is always one of the most elusive 
goals in a civil-justice system.33 But it can also enhance other 
values such as participation, predictability, transparency, and 
rationality.34 
Finally, in limited instances trial by statistics can advance 
plaintiff autonomy. For instance, in Cimino all the plaintiffs in 
the larger group consented to statistical averaging if their 
claims were not selected as samples.35 Thus, Cimino was able to 
sidestep one of the classic arguments against trial by statis-
tics—that individual victims receive too much or too little. 
When all the plaintiffs consent to the process, they get exactly 
what they expect: a quick, efficient result, for which they are 
 
 29. See supra notes 6–13 and accompanying text. 
 30. See supra note 13. 
 31. See Mark A. Peterson, Giving Away Money: Comparative Comments 
on Claims Resolution Facilities, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1990, at 
113 (comparing and analyzing different claims-resolution schemes); cf. In re 
Combustion, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 673, 673–74 (W.D. La. 1997) (awarding com-
pensation based on a special master’s report in which awards were based on 
the number of points a claim had earned for factors such as distance from a 
toxic waste site and medical history). 
 32. Admittedly trial by statistics also requires a defendant to compensate 
some claimants who were entitled to no loaf at all; the invalid claims in the 
unsampled group receive the same average recovery as the valid claims. 
 33. For an extended examination of the equality argument, see Lahav, 
Trial by Formula, supra note 13, at 593–620. 
 34. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 14, at 831–32. 
 35. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 653 (E.D. Tex. 
1990), rev’d, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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willing to trade an individually accurate award. Of course, this 
argument has limits. The quality of the information on which 
consent is based must be good;36 it may not be possible to obtain 
each victim’s consent in some cases; and a defendant’s refusal 
to consent is a cross-cutting factor. 
B. THE DRAWBACKS 
Many of the drawbacks of trial by statistics are mirror im-
ages of the benefits, in the sense that they attack the premises 
underlying the supposed benefits of the process. But some of 
the drawbacks suggest new difficulties. 
The first drawback is that, for the individual victims who 
receive the average award, the process almost always results in 
either over-compensation or under-compensation. That result is 
starkest for those claimants who would have been determined, 
after trial, to deserve no award at all. But other claimants are 
also likely to receive an award that they do not merit, even if 
the defendant ends up paying the right amount of damage in 
the aggregate.37 Not only does this disparity raise an issue of 
accuracy at the microcosmic level of the individual claim, but it 
also raises a macrocosmic question of justice. If a legal system 
must correct wrongs to individuals, as adherents to theories of 
corrective justice hold, then correctly determining a defendant’s 
liability en masse is insufficient. Rather, the linkage between a 
plaintiff’s harm and a defendant’s causal contribution to that 
harm is the only justification for redistribution from a defend-
ant to a plaintiff.38 Except for the sampled cases, trial by statis-
 
 36. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 14, at 825 & nn.77–79 (discussing the 
quality of the plaintiffs’ consent in Cimino and recognizing the need for addi-
tional analysis of the Cimino approach when some plaintiffs refuse to consent). 
 37. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 38. For the argument that corrective justice demands a causal link be-
tween a defendant’s wrong and a plaintiff’s injury, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Cau-
sation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407, 407–16 (1987); Ernest J. 
Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 
949, 979–81 (1988). Modern civil-recourse theory reflects the same intuition. 
See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse Defended: A 
Reply to Posner, Calabresi, Rustad, Chamallas, and Robinette, 88 IND. L.J. 
569, 571 (2013) (“Absent an injury to someone, there is no tort, and even 
where there is an injury connected to wrongful conduct, there is still no tort 
unless the conduct was not merely wrongful in a generic sense, but wrongful 
as to the injury victim.”). See also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipur-
sky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 1641–49 (2002) (arguing that re-
dress is required only when the defendant’s conduct harms the plaintiff, not 
when it creates a risk of harm). 
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tics eliminates the proof on both sides of this connection: the 
defendant’s causal act and the plaintiff’s consequent injury. 
Second, trial by statistics has practical problems that make 
its capacity to determine damages accurately suspect. I have 
already listed the principal difficulties: defining homogenous 
groups or subgroups to sample, selecting a proper sample size, 
ensuring adequate investment incentives for the plaintiffs who 
participate in the exemplary trials, and choosing unbiased 
factfinders.39 If the process fails to yield a good estimate of the 
defendant’s liability, the argument for trial by statistics col-
lapses. 
Third, for all of the unsampled cases, trial by statistics de-
nies the plaintiffs and the defendant their right to a “day in 
court”—an autonomy-enhancing ideal that that is sometimes 
seen as the hallmark of American justice.40 Even if the 
unsampled plaintiffs consent to the process,41 thus mitigating 
the autonomy concern for them, the same is not true for the de-
fendant, whose ability to contest its liability to each plaintiff is 
sacrificed.  
Relatedly, the nature of adjudication arguably demands 
individualized assessment of the facts of each case.42 This ar-
gument hinges on a contestable notion about the meaning of 
adjudication, and further assumes that courts cannot legiti-
mately perform tasks other than this form of particularized 
dispute resolution. But at least on some views of the limits of 
the “judicial Power” in Article III,43 there is a constitutional 
hook for arguing that federal courts do not have the power to 
order a trial by statistics.44 
 
 39. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 40. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (noting that a 
court’s inability to bind nonparties to a prior judgment “is part of our ‘deep-
rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court’” 
(quoting 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4449 (1981))), superseded on other grounds by statute, Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in 
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994). 
 41. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 42. For a development of this argument, which Professor Bone calls the 
“methodological legitimacy objection,” see Bone, supra note 20, at 259–65. 
 43. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish.”). 
 44. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 126 (1995) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (arguing, in the context of the federal courts’ equitable powers in complex 
institutional-reform litigation, that the judicial power should be construed in 
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This same concern transmutes into a constitutional con-
cern with a different textual anchor: that “[a] defendant in a 
class action has a due process right to raise individual chal-
lenges and defenses to claims, and a class action cannot be cer-
tified in a way that eviscerates this right or masks individual 
issues.”45 This argument pits contrasting visions of the Due 
Process Clause against each other. On the one side is the view 
that the Clause requires cost-effective process,46 thus justifying 
a trial-by-statistics approach as long as the defendant’s total 
liability is assessed with sufficient accuracy.47 On the other is 
the view that the Clause protects a right of individual partici-
pation in litigation (except in narrow circumstances, of which 
trial by statistics is not one).48 On this latter view trial by sta-
tistics is constitutionally infirm. 
Another constitutional infirmity is the arguable violation of 
the right to jury trial in civil cases.49 The argument is a variant 
 
accordance with “history and tradition” and “the Framers’ design”). 
 45. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 46. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (noting that due 
process “generally requires consideration of three distinct factors”: “the private 
interest that will be affected”; “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such in-
terest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and “the Government’s interest, 
including . . . the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procedural requirement would entail”); POSNER, supra note 21, § 21.1 
(arguing that the Mathews balancing test instantiates the Hand Formula ap-
proach to determining the process that is due). 
 47. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 785-87 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(upholding a trial-by-statistics plan by relying on the Mathews balancing test); 
Saks & Blanck, supra note 14, at 827–30 (arguing that trial by statistics meets 
the requirement of Mathews). 
 48. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307; McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 
F.3d 215, 232 (2d Cir. 2008) (“When fluid recovery is used to permit the mass 
aggregation of claims, the right of defendants to challenge the allegations of 
individual plaintiffs is lost, resulting in a due process violation.”), abrogated on 
other grounds by Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 656–58 
(2008); cf. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008) (listing six excep-
tions to the due-process requirement that only parties can be bound by a 
judgment); Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996) (holding 
that, in order to bind a person to a judgment, due process generally requires 
that the person be made a party to the case). 
 49. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, . . . the right to 
trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”). Because the Seventh Amendment has 
never been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, state courts 
need not afford litigants the same scope of jury-trial rights. See Robert Wilson, 
Free Speech v. Trial by Jury: The Role of the Jury in the Pickering Test, 18 
GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 389, 401 & n.116 (2008). Nonetheless, all but two 
states (Louisiana and Wyoming) have comparable if not stronger jury-trial 
rights. Id. 
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of the same idea: defendants have a right to have a jury decide 
whether it has harmed each plaintiff and, if so, the amount of 
the damage. Applying an average award to unsampled cases 
violates this right. Like the Due Process Clause, however, the 
Seventh Amendment can be read in different ways. On the 
view that the right to jury trial must adapt to modern condi-
tions, there is no constitutional difficulty with trial by statis-
tics; nor does a defendant have a right to insist on a jury’s pre-
cise allocation of damages among victims as long as the jury 
gets the aggregate damages correct.50 On the contrary view, the 
right to an individualized verdict concerning each victim is an 
essential component of the right to jury trial, and trial by sta-
tistics cannot stand.51 
The idea that defendants have a right to individualized de-
terminations of liability and damages plays into yet another 
doctrinal channel. In cases not premised on federal law, federal 
courts are constitutionally required to apply the relevant 
state’s substantive law.52 If that state’s law requires individual-
ized assessments of causation and damage, then federal courts 
may not use trial by statistics to sidestep the requirement.53 
 
 50. Cf. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, supra note 13, at 589–96 (arguing that 
bellwether trials do not violate the right to jury trial). See generally Ex parte 
Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309–10 (1920) (“New devices may be used to adapt the 
ancient institution [of jury trial] to present needs and to make of it an efficient 
instrument in the administration of justice. Indeed, such changes are essential 
to the preservation of the right.”). For cases finding no Seventh Amendment 
barrier to the use of statistical methods for determining aggregate liability, 
see Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1248–50 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. McLaughlin, 522 F.3d 215; 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 
198, 255–59 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), rev’d on other grounds and questions certified, 
344 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2003) (Blue Cross I), questions answered, 818 N.E.2d 
1140 (N.Y. 2004) (Blue Cross II), rev’d, Empire Healthchoice, Inc. v. Philip 
Morris USA Inc., 393 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2004); In re Estate of Ferdinand E. 
Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1468–69 (D. Haw. 1995), aff’d 
on other grounds sub nom. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 
1996). 
 51. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 319–21 (5th Cir. 
1998). 
 52. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 53. The first case to accept the Erie argument was In re Fibreboard Corp., 
893 F.2d 706, 711–12 (5th Cir. 1990). See also Cimino, 151 F.3d at 321 
(“[F]ederal courts must remain faithful to Erie and must maintain ‘the separa-
tion of powers between the judicial and legislative branches.’ . . . ‘The Judicial 
Branch can offer the trial of lawsuits. It has no power or competence to do 
more.’” (quoting Fibreboard, 893 F.2d at 711–12)). For an argument that state 
law did not prevent aggregate sampling and that Erie was therefore not of-
fended, see Blue Cross, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 259–62. On appeal, the Second Cir-
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A final permutation of the theme is that any changes to the 
requirement of individualized proof of liability and damages—
for both state-law and federal-law claims—is a legislative deci-
sion, and therefore beyond the purview of a court. Insofar as a 
federal court is contemplating the use of trial by statistics, the 
Rules Enabling Act (Enabling Act) therefore stands as a barri-
er. The Enabling Act allows the Supreme Court to promulgate 
“general rules of practice and procedure,”54 but only when those 
rules do not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right.”55 In Wal-Mart the Supreme Court observed that using 
trial by statistics to make class actions workable would render 
Rule 23 (as applied) suspect under the Enabling Act.56 Because 
the point was not essential to its holding, the Court did not ex-
plain its reasoning in detail, noting only that a defendant is 
“entitled to litigate its statutory defenses to individual 
claims.”57 By extension, a defendant has a right to contest the 
fact of its liability to each claimant, including the fact of the 
claimant’s injury.58 But the Court said nothing about whether 
trial by statistics was a permissible means to adjudicate the 
amount of injury. Put differently, the Enabling Act prevents a 
federal court from certifying a class action in which the trial 
plan precludes a defendant from contesting the wrongfulness of 
its conduct toward each claimant and the causal connection be-
tween its conduct and each claimant’s alleged injury. Whether 
 
cuit certified the issue of New York’s amenability to aggregate statistical proof 
to the New York Court of Appeals, but the Court of Appeals’ decision on an-
other issue made it unnecessary to reach the point. See supra note 10. 
 54. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012). 
 55. Id. § 2072(b). 
 56. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011). For a 
contrary argument ultimately superseded by Wal-Mart, see Schwab v. Philip 
Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1271–72 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
 57. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561. 
 58. Cf. Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure 
of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 156–57 (2003) (“[T]he basis for 
the implied delegation of bargaining power to class counsel must arise from 
matters that preexist the class action itself and, accordingly, that a class set-
tlement—unlike public legislation—enjoys no general mandate to alter unilat-
erally the rights of class members.”). Although Professor Nagareda’s argument 
specifically addressed the need to settle cases on the basis of preexisting legal 
rights, his argument applies equally to novel methods of adjudication that al-
ter the entitlement of class members to recovery. In a different section of Wal-
Mart, the Court referenced elements of Professor Nagareda’s theory. Wal-
Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556; see also id. at 2562, 2566 n.9 (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (accepting aspects of Professor Nagareda’s theory). 
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it prevents a court from providing an average award to claim-
ants when the defendant remains free to contest liability and 
causation is an open question. 
This reading of Wal-Mart gets some support from the 
Court’s recent decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend.59 In 
Behrend the plaintiffs alleged four antitrust violations.60 At the 
class certification hearing, the plaintiffs’ expert presented a 
damages model to calculate the harm to the class as a result of 
these violations.61 The district court certified a class for only 
one of the four violations.62 
The Supreme Court overturned the certification order be-
cause the expert’s model had been premised on the existence of 
four antitrust violations; it had not segregated the amount of 
damages arising from the single violation on which the class 
could proceed. That was a fatal error, for “a model purporting 
to serve as evidence of damages in this class action must meas-
ure only those damages attributable to [the one viable] theo-
ry.”63 On the other hand, the Court did not expect similar preci-
sion with regard to a model’s determination of the quantum of 
injury: “Calculations need not be exact,” as long as they are 
“‘consistent with [the] liability case.’”64 
 
 59. 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
 60. Id. at 1430–31. 
 61. Id. at 1431. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1433. 
 64. Id. (quoting ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROVING ANTITRUST 
DAMAGES: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 57, 62 (2d ed. 2010)); see also Int’l 
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 372 (1977) (stating that, 
when a court attempts to fashion relief for class members who were victims of 
past racial discrimination, the “process of recreating the past will necessarily 
involve a degree of approximation and imprecision” and require the court to 
“balance the equities of each [class member’s] situation”). The same intuition 
can be found in lower-court decisions that refuse to condition class certification 
on an accurate calculation of individual damages but demand proof of the link 
between the defendant’s conduct and class members’ damages. See, e.g., In re 
Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 1257 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[The defend-
ant’s] liability as to each class member was proven through common evidence; 
extrapolation was used only to approximate damages. Wal-Mart does not pro-
hibit certification based on the use of extrapolation to calculate damages.”); In 
re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 535 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming 
class certification when “the fact of damages was a question common to the 
class even if the amount of damages sustained by each individual class mem-
ber varied,” and further noting that the court’s prior decisions had “never re-
quired a precise mathematical calculation of damages before deeming a class 
worthy of certification” (internal quotation marks omitted)); McLaughlin v. 
Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A]ggregate determination 
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Trial by statistics, of course, dispenses with proof of a 
causal connection for all the aggregated claims except for the 
sampled victims: the non-liability of the defendant to some 
unsampled class members is accounted for by reducing the av-
erage award.65 While this approach may get the aggregate lia-
bility of the defendant right, it fails to allow the defendant to 
prove that its conduct caused no harm to a given plaintiff. The 
lesson of Wal-Mart and Comcast is that a class action cannot 
take a shortcut to avoid turning this very square corner.66 
C. SUMMARY 
It is worth remembering that Wal-Mart’s opposition to trial 
by statistics could be overcome by legislation, and state courts 
are not required to follow the Supreme Court’s understanding 
of Rule 23.67 Although Wal-Mart has effectively sealed its fate 
in federal court for the time being, trial by statistics remains 
alive in theory.68 Perhaps that is to be expected, given that the 
 
is likely to result in an astronomical damages figure that does not accurately 
reflect the number of plaintiffs actually injured by defendants and that bears 
little or no relationship to the amount of economic harm actually caused by 
defendants.”), abrogated on other grounds by Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. 
Co., 553 U.S. 639, 656–58 (2008); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 191–92 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A]ctual injury cannot be 
presumed, and defendants have the right to raise individual defenses against 
each class member.”); In re Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 90 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(“[A]llowing gross damages by treating unsubstantiated claims of class mem-
bers collectively significantly alters substantive rights . . . .”). 
 65. In the example at the start of this Section, I calculated the $15,000 
average award by including the one defense verdict out of the ten total ver-
dicts, and dividing the total award ($150,000 for the nine plaintiff verdicts 
plus $0 for the one defense verdict) by the total number of verdicts (ten). The 
same outcome would result if I had added up and averaged only the nine 
plaintiff verdicts ($150,000 ÷ 9, or $16,666.67), and then reduced that average 
by the 90% success rate for plaintiffs ($16,666.67 × .9, or $15,000). 
 66. For a case analyzing this connection between Wal-Mart and Comcast, 
see Jacob v. Duane Reade, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 578, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Comcast 
brings damages to the forefront of the class certification inquiry—a holding 
that, when combined with [Wal-Mart’s] discussion of trial by formula, suggests 
that where individualized damages questions so predominate over damages 
questions capable of classwide proof, certification is inappropriate and raises 
due process concerns for defendants.”). 
 67. Any federal legislation or state adoption of trial by statistics would 
need to answer the constitutional objections discussed supra notes 42–53 and 
accompanying text. 
 68. Some post-Wal-Mart courts have expressed their belief that trial by 
statistics is available in some cases. See, e.g., Urethane Antitrust, 768 F.3d at 
1257, 1269 (noting that “Wal-Mart does not prohibit certification based on the 
use of extrapolation to calculate damages,” and further stating that the Sev-
enth Amendment does not prohibit a pro rata reduction in class damages 
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arguments on both sides are strong and trial by statistics can 
do some very useful work. Thus far, however, the cases and 
commentators have not provided a roadmap that explains as a 
practical matter how judges can navigate around Wal-Mart’s 
imposing roadblock. 
Although the issue is close, trial by statistics in its present 
form deserves its fate. Despite the caselaw and academic litera-
ture that have argued for compensation based on risk as a 
means to achieve optimal deterrence,69 denying defendants the 
ability to submit evidence tending to disprove that their con-
duct caused harm to a specific claimant remains a bridge too 
far under present American law. 
But that fact does not the end the matter. When argu-
ments lie in close equipoise, there often exists a mediating solu-
tion that captures many of an idea’s benefits while sidestepping 
 
when a jury awarded less than the expert’s statistical model suggested be-
cause a defendant “has no interest in the method of distributing the aggregate 
damages award among the class members”); Balasanyan v. Nordstrom, Inc., 
294 F.R.D. 550, 572 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (finding that the use of a survey to estab-
lish damages did not violate Wal-Mart or the defendant’s due-process rights); 
Alcantar v. Hobart Serv., No. ED CV 11-1600 PSG (SPx), 2013 WL 146323, at 
*4–5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2013) (noting that Wal-Mart was inapplicable when 
the calculation of wage-and-hour penalties did not require individualized de-
terminations); see also Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-03339-
EJD, 2012 WL 5818300, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2012) (collecting cases refus-
ing to permit a trial-by-statistics approach after Wal-Mart); United States v. 
City of New York, 276 F.R.D. 22, 37 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[T]he court must look to 
the underlying substantive law to determine whether the proposed method of 
classwide proof prevents the party opposing class certification from asserting 
its substantive rights.”). Commentators also continue to make normative ar-
guments favoring the process. See Bone, supra note 20, at 230 (analyzing the 
argument from various normative perspectives and concluding that, even after 
Wal-Mart, “there is still room left for sampling in future cases”); Cheng, supra 
note 23 (grounding the argument in accuracy); Lahav, Trial by Formula, supra 
note 13 (grounding the argument in equality). 
 69. For some of the leading academic commentary, see Joseph H. King, 
Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Pre-
existing Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981); Glen 
O. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 
J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 781–83 (1985); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection 
in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 849, 855 (1984). The best-known judicial instance of substituting liability 
based on risk for liability based on causation is market-share liability. See 
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936–38 (Cal. 1980) (making manufac-
turers responsible for their share of the product market when the products are 
identical and the plaintiffs, through no fault of their own, cannot prove which 
manufacturer’s product caused harm). But see Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. 
Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1066–68 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that the market-share 
theory did not apply to manufacturers of handguns). 
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many of its weaknesses. The following section describes a prac-
tical and defensible middle ground for trial by statistics. 
II.  PRESUMPTIVE JUDGMENTS   
If the central and ultimately fatal flaw of trial by statistics 
is its failure to permit unsampled plaintiffs or defendants to 
contest the average award in a particular case, then the only 
way to realize the benefits of the process is to nudge the parties 
voluntarily to accept the average award. The simplest way to 
do so is to establish a presumption that the average award (de-
termined according to appropriate sampling practices) applies 
to every unsampled case. Any plaintiff can overcome the pre-
sumption by submitting evidence that her individual award ex-
ceeds the presumptive judgment. The defendant can overcome 
the presumption by submitting evidence that the plaintiff in 
question deserves less than the presumptive judgment—either 
by raising individual issues that would eliminate liability alto-
gether (such as causation or an applicable defense) or by show-
ing that the plaintiff’s damages are less than the presumption. 
When a party challenges the award, the other party may intro-
duce evidence to the contrary. As soon as either party challeng-
es the award, the presumption collapses.70 The court must use 
ordinary adjudicatory methods to determine the liability of the 
defendant to that individual plaintiff and the damages (if any). 
To be clear, the proposal breaks no new ground for the use 
of trial by statistics. The presumptive judgment is not an option 
for every aggregated case. It should not be available when an-
other method for calculating damages is more cost-effective.71 
 
 70. The “bursting bubble” theory of presumptions is originally associated 
with Professors Thayer and Wigmore. See 21B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 5121, 
5122.1, 5126 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the “bursting bubble”); cf. FED. R. EVID. 
301 (requiring a party against whom a presumption is directed in a civil case 
to produce evidence to rebut the presumption but keeping the burden of per-
suasion on whichever party originally bore it). 
 71. In some cases, such a simple method exists. See supra note 2 and ac-
companying text; see also George v. Nat’l Water Main Cleaning Co., 286 F.R.D. 
168, 181–82 (D. Mass. 2012) (holding that trial-by-statistics concerns were not 
implicated when the defendant had a uniform wage policy and individual 
damages could be calculated by “reconstructing the correct wage algorithm”). 
Of course, the argument for trial by statistics is often made at the start of 
the case, in conjunction with a class-certification motion and before the de-
fendant has sunk any costs into the case. See supra notes 5–13 and accompa-
nying text. If the presumptive-average approach is used to convince a court to 
certify a class action in which the social benefits of the class action are lower 
than its costs, then the approach does more harm than good. I proceed on the 
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Likewise, the alleged victims may be insufficiently homogenous 
or insufficiently identifiable to justify sampling.72 Even when 
an aggregated case is a good candidate for sampling, the pro-
cess must be carried out with scientific rigor, and the results 
must be of sufficient quality to justify the court’s extrapolation 
of the average award to the unsampled cases.73 Only when 
sampling can reliably determine the aggregate amount of the 
defendant’s liability to the plaintiffs may trial by statistics be 
used. 
The effect of this proposal is to put trial by statistics, as 
modified, back into a judge’s case-management toolbox. This 
Part considers the mechanics of presumptive judgments and 
the steps needed to avoid gamesmanship by the parties in their 
use of the process. It then evaluates the resulting system in 
light of the arguments for and against trial by statistics that 
Part I described. 
A. HOW PRESUMPTIVE JUDGMENTS WORK 
The critical problem for presumptive judgments is to get 
both parties to accept the presumptive award when either par-
ty can collapse the presumption so easily. For instance, if the 
presumptive award is $15,000, it is evident that a plaintiff who 
expects to receive only $5000 from an individual trial would 
jump at the presumptive award, but a rational defendant would 
want to challenge the award. The opposite is true when the 
plaintiff expects a $25,000 recovery in an individual trial; the 
defendant would be thrilled to escape with a $15,000 payment, 
but the plaintiff will push for a full recovery. It appears that 
 
assumptions that presumptive averaging is the least expensive way to deter-
mine damages and that the social gains from a class action adopting this ap-
proach exceed the costs. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (permitting class certifica-
tion only when, among other requirements, the “class action is superior to 
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controver-
sy”); cf. Jay Tidmarsh, Superiority As Unity, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 565 (2013) 
(arguing that class actions should be certified only when they yield a net social 
benefit). 
 72. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 73. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 14, at 841–51. For a general discussion 
of some of the issues involved in sampling and the use of statistics, see FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REFERENCE MANUAL ON 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 211–502 (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter REFERENCE 
MANUAL]. See also Joseph B. Kadane, Probability Sampling in Litigation, 18 
CONN. INS. L.J. 297, 299–303 (2011) (describing the use of statistical sampling 
in various cases). 
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the only cases that presumptive averaging will eliminate are 
those that, by coincidence, are worth exactly $15,000. 
Presumptive averaging, however, takes advantage of the 
reality that the party wishing to rebut the presumption must 
incur costs to do so. If it will cost a person $20,000 to contest 
the presumption and the effort can be expected to effect only a 
$10,000 change in the award, then the economically rational 
response is to accept the presumptive award.74 More generally, 
if X equals the presumptive judgment, C -1 equals the costs to 
the plaintiff of proving that award,75 and C -2 equals the costs to 
the plaintiff of proving that the plaintiff is entitled to individu-
al judgment P × L, then the plaintiff will accept the presump-
tive judgment X as long as 
X – C -1 > (P × L) – C -2, 
and will challenge the judgment when 
X – C -1 < (P × L) – C -2. 
Another way to express the same idea is that a plaintiff 
will challenge the presumptive award only when the net ex-
pected award from an individual trial is greater than the net 
presumptive award; otherwise, the plaintiff will not.76 
The converse proposition is true for the defendant. If it will 
cost a defendant $20,000 to contest the presumptive $15,000 
judgment, then the economically rational defendant will simply 
pay the award. More generally, if X equals the presumptive 
judgment, C•-1 equals the cost of providing a plaintiff with this 
 
 74. I loosen this assumption to account for repeat players. See infra Part 
II.B.3. 
 75. These costs will arise from various sources. For instance, some portion 
of the expenses for trying the sample cases may be spread across the unsam-
pled cases. In addition, attorney’s fees and case-specific expenses may also be 
deducted from the presumptive award. Cf. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 
472, 479–82 (1980) (affirming the use of a common-fund approach to pay class 
counsel’s fee out of the fund from which class members are compensated). 
 76. On the assumption that a plaintiff is risk-neutral, the plaintiff’s net 
expected recovery in an individual lawsuit is determined by the familiar for-
mula (P × L) – C , where P represents the probability of recovery, L the 
amount of the recovery, and C  the costs incurred by the plaintiff in prosecut-
ing the case. See POSNER, supra note 21, § 21.1 (describing this calculus in the 
context of the Due Process Clause); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Tri-
al: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Le-
gal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 57 (1982) (discussing how risk-neutral parties 
make decisions about filing or maintaining a lawsuit based on expected value, 
“discounting possible outcomes by their probabilities”). I discuss the effect of a 
plaintiff’s different preferences for risk (in other words, being a risk taker or 
being risk-averse) on the plaintiff’s decision to challenge the presumption infra 
notes 116–119 and accompanying text. 
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award,77 and C•-2 equals the costs to the defendant of proving 
that a plaintiff is entitled to individual award P × L, then the 
defendant will pay the presumptive award X as long as 
X + C•-1 < (P × L) + C•-2, 
and will challenge the award when 
X + C•-1 > (P × L) + C•-2. 
Put differently, a defendant will challenge the presumptive 
judgment only when the expected payment from an individual 
trial, inclusive of litigation costs, is lower than the gross 
amount of the presumptive award plus the cost of providing 
this compensation;78 otherwise, the defendant will not.79 
Therefore, the extent of the parties’ mutual willingness to 
accept the presumptive award is essentially defined by the size 
of their litigation costs in individual trials. For instance, as-
sume that there are one hundred cases, and that random sam-
pling of ten cases provides statistically valid information about 
the remainder. The average award of these ten trials is 
$15,000, which then becomes the presumptive award to all 
class members. Plaintiffs who opt for the award will receive a 
net amount of $12,000 (after deduction of $3000 to account for 
their pro rata share of expenses and fees in the sampled trials). 
The defendant will spend $1000 investigating each unsampled 
case and making the payment to plaintiffs who opt for the 
award. The expenses of an individual damages trial would be 
$10,000 apiece for the plaintiff and defendant. Finally, assume 
that, of the ninety unsampled cases, twelve would involve ex-
pected recoveries between $0 and $5999; twenty between $6000 
and $12,000; forty between $12,001 and $18,000, fifteen be-
tween $18,000 and $22,000, and three above $22,000. 
 
 77. These costs are likely to be minimal. They include the cost of evaluat-
ing a plaintiff’s claim to see if the presumptive award should be challenged 
(even though it ultimately is not), as well as the administrative cost of making 
the payment itself. 
 78. Unlike the plaintiff, the defendant is unconcerned with the net aver-
age recovery (X – C -1) because it pays the gross amount of the award (X) to 
each plaintiff who accepts the presumptive judgment. The defendant has also 
already expended money in the litigation process that culminated in the sam-
pling trials and the calculation of the presumptive award, but at this point 
those are sunk costs. The defendant’s goal now is to minimize future costs. 
 79. If a defendant is risk-neutral, the maximum that the defendant would 
be willing to pay a plaintiff in an individual lawsuit is (P × L) + C•, where C• 
represents the costs incurred by the defendant in defending the case. For a 
discussion of the influence of risk preferences on the defendant’s decision to 
either pay the presumptive judgment or fight it, see infra notes 116–119 and 
accompanying text. 
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In these circumstances, the defendant has an incentive to 
contest the presumptive award in the twelve cases with the 
lowest value;80 conversely, the three plaintiffs with the highest-
value claims also have an incentive to reject the presumptive 
judgment.81 A presumptive-judgment approach does not elimi-
nate all trials; on the hypothetical numbers that I have provid-
ed, fifteen cases will be litigated individually, in addition to the 
ten cases that were randomly sampled. But the process cuts out 
at least seventy-five trials.82 
Of course, the numbers that I have used are highly styl-
ized, intended to show the operation of the presumption.83 The 
following section raises a series of real-world difficulties with 
presumptive judgments, and then suggests solutions to remedy 
them. 
B. FIVE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 
The presumptive-judgment approach assumes that the 
parties are rational economic actors who act to maximize their 
own welfare. But the parties may not act rationally; or in acting 
rationally to advance their own self-interest, they may not act 
in a way most conducive to society’s best interests. This section 
explores a series of circumstances in which one or the other of 
these circumstances pertains. It begins, however, with a more 
 
 80. In the lowest-value cases, the value of X + C•-1 ($15,000 plus $1000) 
exceeds the value of (P × L) + C•-2 (a maximum of $5999 plus $10,000). Because 
opting for the presumptive award is therefore more expensive than individual 
litigation, the defendant will litigate. 
 81. In the highest-value cases, the value of X – C -1 ($15,000 less $3000) is 
lower than the value of (P × L) – C -2 (a minimum of $22,001 less $10,000). Be-
cause opting for the presumptive award is therefore less advantageous to the-
se claimants than individual litigation, the highest-value plaintiffs will liti-
gate. 
 82. In the end, it may not be necessary to conduct all fifteen trials. As 
more trials are conducted, the parties will obtain more precise information 
about the value of the claims and may then be able to settle some of the con-
tested cases. For those cases that require trial, appointing a special master to 
preside over the trials is an option that would limit the burden on the judici-
ary. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1)(B)(ii) (authorizing a court to appoint a master 
to “resolve a difficult computation of damages”). 
 83. Indeed, a full model would treat P × L and the other variables as a 
distribution (assigning to certain outcomes certain probabilities) rather than a 
single number. See Samuel Issacharoff, Assembling Class Actions, 90 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 699, 718 n.92 (2013). In deciding whether to accept a presumptive 
award, however, a party would still likely reduce this distribution to a single 
number. 
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technical issue involving the calculation of the presumptive 
award. 
1. Outlier Verdicts and the Presumptive “Average”  
In the last section I assumed that the presumptive average 
was $15,000, but I did not explain how the court should calcu-
late that figure. In the classic form of trial by statistics, the av-
erage is determined by including all the verdicts—including de-
fense verdicts (which are assigned a value of $0) and high-value 
verdicts. With presumptive averaging, however, the parties 
have an incentive to try the unsampled cases in which the costs 
of trial for them are less than the marginal gain from their ex-
pected recovery in relation to the presumptive average. The 
random sample may include some of the same type of “outlier” 
claims. Because these outlier claims would be tried in any 
event, an argument can be made not to include these verdicts 
when calculating the presumptive average. 
In concrete terms, assume that we expect the cost of an in-
dividual trial to each side to be $10,000, and that the ten sam-
ple trials yield one defense verdict, two verdicts of $13,000, four 
of $15,000, two of $17,000, and one of $50,000. In the classic 
form of trial by statistics, all the verdicts are thrown together, 
for an average of $17,000. Had they been unsampled cases, 
however, two of these claims were likely to have been tried un-
der a presumptive-averaging process: the defense verdict and 
the $50,000 claim. If we exclude these claims in calculating the 
mean, then the average verdict of the remaining eight claims is 
$15,000.84 
In a world of perfect information, the correct approach is to 
exclude the outlier claims in determining the presumptive av-
erage; then defendants pay the amount of compensation that 
exactly matches the harm they cause. But courts do not possess 
perfect information. They do not know, for instance, exactly 
what the costs of trying the unsampled cases will be (a figure 
that I assumed to be $10,000 for each party). Without that 
basic datum, a court cannot know precisely which cases to in-
clude or exclude. Moreover, in all likelihood the actual cost to 
 
 84. In the example, a presumptive average that excludes the outlier 
claims is less than a presumptive average that includes them, so that the de-
fendant gains an advantage from excluding these claims. The opposite result 
could occur if the sampled claims had more defense verdicts or no high-value 
outlier claims. In other words, the choice of method for calculating the pre-
sumptive average does not invariably favor either plaintiffs or defendants. 
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try an unsampled claim will vary from case to case. Because 
this actual cost is critical to defining which cases are outliers 
(and therefore excludable from the presumptive average), the 
court may have a difficult time identifying the outliers. Indeed, 
some of the outlier cases may have been ones in which the par-
ties would have accepted the presumptive average. For in-
stance, if the defendant had paid $20,000 to achieve its sole de-
fense verdict, the defendant may have preferred to take the 
presumptive average rather than go to trial. (It was unable to 
do so, however, because of the need to sample randomly.) 
Should such an outlier be counted as a claim worth the pre-
sumptive average rather than a claim worth $0? To avoid these 
difficulties, a court might choose the administratively simpler 
and ultimately less expensive solution of using the results of all 
the cases, including the outliers, in calculating the amount of 
the presumptive judgment; the costs of obtaining a more accu-
rate average may outweigh the gains from greater accuracy. 
Other solutions for calculating the presumptive award are 
also possible. A solution used among statisticians is to replace 
the arithmetic mean with the median (which, on the figures in 
the hypothetical, is coincidentally $15,000).85 Another is to dis-
card the outliers (often defined as the top and bottom ten per-
cent of the results) and then to figure the presumptive average 
on the basis of the “trimmed mean”—although this technique is 
controversial because it excludes data.86 
There exists no one-size-fits-all solution to the problem of 
outliers. If a random sample is well constructed, the issue 
should be minimal. Although the problem is brought to the fore 
in a system of presumptive judgments, the same concerns exist 
in the classic form of trial by statistics. Once the trials con-
clude, the court, with the aid of statistical experts, must deter-
mine the most statistically appropriate way to represent the 
 
 85. See REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 238 (noting that “studies 
of damage awards in tort cases find that the mean is larger than the median” 
and that “[i]f one is seeking a single, representative number for the awards, 
the median may be more useful than the mean”); cf. In re Educ. Testing Serv. 
Praxis Principles of Learning & Teaching: Grades 7–12 Litig., 447 F. Supp. 2d 
612, 624 (E.D. La. 2006) (adopting the median of prior individual settlements 
to determine the fair value of a class settlement). 
 86. See REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 240 (discussing the rea-
sons to discard outlier values in computing the mean); Stephen M. Stigler, The 
Asymptotic Distribution of the Trimmed Mean, 1 ANNALS STAT. 472 (1973) 
(discussing potential problems with using the “trimmed mean” and possible 
solutions to those problems). 
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average result in view of the ultimate goals of the process: de-
terrence and adequate compensation.87 
The presence of a significant number of outliers may well 
signal a lack of homogeneity within the sample. That concern 
merits separate consideration. 
2. A Lack of Homogeneity  
In many cases, presumptive judgments will work best only 
when the results cluster close enough to the average that the 
parties mutually have little incentive to litigate the individual 
claims. For instance, assume a random sample of ten claims in 
which two claims result in defense verdicts, two result in $2000 
verdicts, two in $5000 verdicts, two in $18,000 verdicts, and 
two in $40,000 verdicts. Further assume that we use the 
arithmetic mean of the ten claims ($15,000) as the average, and 
that each party will spend $10,000 in individual trials. If the 
sample is representative of the remaining claims, the parties 
will jointly accept the presumptive award in only 20% of the 
cases; one party or the other has an incentive to contest the 
presumption in the remaining 80%. With so little promise of 
eliminating trials, the presumptive judgment may not be a use-
ful device to resolve the individual claims. On the other hand, if 
the results of the sample trials yield a situation in which only 
10% of the cases might result in individual trials, the process 
seems more promising—unless, perhaps, there were a million 
claims.88 
The ideal of few outlier claims puts an important limitation 
on the use of presumptive judgments. The approach is most 
likely to be useful when the defendant’s liability to the plain-
tiffs is essentially uniform and the damages cluster within the 
boundaries established by the parties’ costs of trying individual 
claims.89 Conversely, presumptive averaging is least likely to be 
 
 87. The place at which the average is set also has an effect on the parties’ 
incentives to litigate. If the selected method yields a higher average than other 
available methods, then fewer plaintiffs have an incentive to contest the pre-
sumption, but the defendant has an incentive to dispute a greater number of 
low-value cases. The opposite is true if the selected method yields a lower av-
erage than other available methods. Although statistical validity, deterrence, 
and compensation should be primary considerations in selecting an averaging 
method, choosing a method that reduces the likelihood of individual litigation 
may be relevant as a second-order consideration. 
 88. If presumptive averaging is to be useful, the percentage of the claims 
that are outliers requiring trial must decrease as the absolute number of 
claims increases. 
 89. The formula set out in the text following note 75 determines the upper 
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helpful when there is significant variability among the claims—
either in terms of the defendant’s liability or in terms of the 
amount of damages. A court facing such variability has a lim-
ited number of options. One is to break the claims into sub-
classes in which the variability of injury is less, and to use pre-
sumptive judgments for each subclass. But the creation of 
subclasses increases the number of sample trials that must oc-
cur, and thus reduces the efficiency gains from averaging. In 
some cases courts could use the data from the sample trials to 
construct regression models that determine the value of claims 
with particular characteristics (age, gender, salary), thus ren-
dering subclasses unnecessary.90 Another option is to extract 
general information from the sampled claims in order to reduce 
the issues remaining in individual trials; for instance, the court 
could ask the juries in the sampled cases to itemize damages, 
and then fashion a presumptive award for a common element 
like pain and suffering while conducting discrete mini-trials on 
variable issues like lost earning capacity or medical expenses. 
A fourth option is to suffer the consequences of outliers; if the 
number of claims is not overwhelming, reducing their number 
by even 20% might be a useful time saver. Only as a last resort 
should courts reject presumptive awards in favor of some other 
form for resolving the dispute.91 
Presumptive averaging’s need for a sample containing little 
variability also carries a risk. As we have seen, homogeneity 
within a sample is valuable in its own right; it helps to ensure 
the validity of the sample results, thus making extrapolation 
possible.92 A homogenous sample carries a secondary benefit in 
a system of presumptive averaging: fewer cases in which a par-
ty’s expected gains from contesting the presumptive average 
will exist, and therefore fewer individual trials will occur. But 
the two types of homogeneity are not the same thing. A court 
 
boundary, and the formula set out in the text following note 77 determines the 
lower boundary.  
 90. See Kadane, supra note 73, at 304. I thank Ed Cheng for this idea. 
 91. This other form might not be a class action, and might even mean that 
a defendant will not be subject to liability for most or even all of the harm that 
it caused. Because presumptive judgments should be used only when they are 
better than alternatives, see supra note 71 and accompanying text, the use of 
this alternative form is necessarily worse than the use of presumptive judg-
ments. But as long as the legal system insists on the right of defendants to 
make individual challenges to liability and damages determinations, see supra 
notes 58–66 and accompanying text, the cost of not using presumptive judg-
ments is one that the legal system must bear. 
 92. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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must be careful not to let the tail wag the dog: in other words, 
not to let the desire to construct a sample with few outliers93 
overcome the obligation to conduct scientifically valid random 
sampling. 
For this reason, the use of presumptive judgments, in the 
main, is least likely to be helpful in positive-value cases94 that 
contain significant fact-specific variations in either liability or 
damages. Conversely, it is most likely to be helpful in positive-
value cases with little variability on the issues of liability and 
damages and in those “negative-value” cases95 in which the par-
ties have little to no incentive to contest the claims individual-
ly. Thus, presumptive judgments might work well for a large 
single-event catastrophe, such as an airplane crash or a factory 
explosion that levels a neighborhood—although even here sig-
nificant variations in damages may exist and subclassing may 
be necessary. The same is true of a consumer claim in which a 
defendant has illegally overcharged ten million customers by 
$.10 per transaction, with no customer having more than one 
thousand transactions (or $100 in damages). In a perfect world, 
if the cost of determining the damages to each consumer ex-
ceeded $100 for both the plaintiff and the defendant, then nei-
ther side has an incentive to contest the presumptive award of, 
 
 93. What I mean by “outlier” in this context is a case whose factual or le-
gal posture is sufficiently different from those of other claims in the sample 
that a difference in outcome is both expected and is large enough that the 
plaintiff or defendant would have had an incentive to reject the presumptive 
judgment. 
 94. “Positive-value” cases are those in which the amount of money at 
stake is sufficiently great that the plaintiff has an incentive to bring an indi-
vidual lawsuit. 
 95. In “negative-value” (or “large-scale, small-claim”) cases, the costs of 
individual litigation for a plaintiff exceed the value of the claim, effectively 
making the claim worthless. Class actions, which aggregate negative-value 
claims, can make such claims financially viable. See Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Deriva-
tive Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 8–11 (1991). For this reason, courts have tended to be more 
hospitable to the use of class actions in negative-value cases than in positive-
value cases. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 
(1997) (stating that, although Rule 23(b)(3) “does not exclude from certification 
cases in which individual damages run high,” aggregation of small-value 
claims is the core reason for using class actions); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 
84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (arguing that small-stakes cases present 
“[t]he most compelling rationale for finding superiority in a class action”); In re 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In most class 
actions—and those the ones in which the rationale for the procedure is most 
compelling—individual suits are infeasible because the claim of each class 
member is tiny relative to the expense of litigation.”). 
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say, $20 that random sampling yields. Of course, the world is 
not perfect, as the following section explains. 
3. Strategic Behavior  
In the imperfect real world, the defendant has an incentive 
to act strategically and object to the presumptive award in 
many negative-value cases. Assume, for instance, that the pre-
sumptive average award is $20, that no plaintiff’s claim ex-
ceeds $100, and that it would cost the plaintiff and the defend-
ant $2000 apiece to prove the exact amount of damages. As 
long as the cost to the defendant of filing an objection to the 
presumptive award is less than $20, the defendant will do so. 
The reason is that, because the cost to the plaintiff of proving 
individual damages ($2000) exceeds the value of the claim (no 
more than $100), an economically rational plaintiff will drop 
the claim. Thus, even though the defendant’s cost of defending 
against an individual claim is also high, it can avoid any liabil-
ity by filing an objection. 
Given that a prime instance for the use of presumptive 
judgments is this sort of negative-value claim, the defendant’s 
strategic behavior threatens the entire presumptive-average 
approach. But the problem of strategic behavior is greater than 
the negative-value situation. It is possible that a plaintiff (or 
the defendant) may reject the presumptive award merely to ex-
tort a higher (or lower) payment. For instance, if we assume 
that the presumptive average award is $15,000, and that the 
costs to each side of proving individual damages is $10,000, a 
plaintiff with a claim whose expected value is $15,000 may re-
ject the presumptive award and seek to settle the case with the 
defendant for $24,000.96 Likewise, the defendant may reject the 
presumptive award even for claims with an expected value of 
$15,000 and seek to settle for $6000. Especially if there is an 
imbalance in bargaining power between the sides, one party 
may try to impose costs to obtain a better deal. 
Solutions to the problem of strategic behavior are at hand, 
although they are rather radical. One is to require a trial of any 
 
 96. A comparable phenomenon has been observed in class-action practice: 
class members who either object to a class settlement or opt out of the class in 
order to garner a settlement from the defendant that exceeds the award for 
other class members. See John E. Lopatka & D. Brooks Smith, Class Action 
Professional Objectors: What To Do About Them?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 865 
(2012) (discussing objectors); D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons 
in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1201 (2013) (discussing opt-
outs). 
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case in which either party rejects the presumptive award; with 
the prospect of extracting a more favorable settlement gone, 
neither party has an incentive to act in a strategic fashion. This 
solution seems to run counter to the principle that settlements 
should be favored over litigation,97 but in fact the opposite is 
true. The point of mandating trial for those who reject the pre-
sumptive award is to provide the parties with an incentive to 
accept the presumptive judgment, thus encouraging settlement. 
But this solution is not perfect, for it lets a repeat player (likely 
the defendant) who is willing to incur the costs of trial establish 
a reputation for litigiousness that may discourage the assertion 
of claims against it. 
A better way to avoid strategic behavior is to allocate all of 
the reasonable costs of an individual proceeding—including an 
attorney’s fee—to the party who rejects the presumptive 
award.98 Unless another fee-shifting provision requires it,99 the 
proposal does not shift costs (including the costs of the sample 
trials) that were incurred before the presumptive award is de-
termined. The effect of this limited cost shifting is to cut off a 
party’s reason to reject a settlement for extortionate purposes. 
Because the rejecting party must pay the opponent’s expenses 
in continuing to litigate, it can no longer use the opponent’s 
 
 97. See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013) (noting “the 
public policy favoring settlement of disputes”); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk 
Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 407 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing “the 
policy favoring the settlement of protracted litigation”); Rodriguez v. Nat’l City 
Bank, 726 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2013) (articulating “a policy preference favor-
ing voluntary settlement in class actions”). 
 98. A variation of this proposal is to require an objecting party to bear the 
expenses of the opposing party unless the objecting party obtains an award 
that falls outside the boundary within which an actor who is not acting strate-
gically would accept the award. Thus, a plaintiff who obtained an award 
higher than the boundary established in the formula found in the text follow-
ing note 75 would not be responsible for the defendant’s costs. Likewise, a de-
fendant who obtained an award lower than the boundary established in the 
formula set out in the text following note 77 would not be responsible for the 
plaintiff’s costs. But informational problems beset this idea; it is easier in the-
ory than in practice to compute the boundary lines, and the number may not 
even be knowable at the time when a party must decide whether to reject a 
presumptive award. 
 99. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (permitting a court to assess “excess 
costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees reasonably incurred” against a party “who 
so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously”); 42 
U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012) (permitting a court to award “a reasonable attorney’s 
fee” to a “prevailing party” in certain civil-rights cases); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4) 
(permitting a court to award a sanction, including “part or all of the reasona-
ble attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation” of 
the obligations contained in Rule 11(b)). 
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fear of incurring those expenses as a cudgel to extract a more 
favorable settlement. 
This approach also has a salutary secondary effect: it re-
duces the number of outlier claims. If we assume that the aver-
age award is $15,000 and it would cost each party $10,000 to 
try an individual claim, a party considering the rejection of the 
presumptive award must now factor in not only its own costs in 
an individual trial ($10,000) but also the costs of the opponent 
(an additional $10,000). Thus, a plaintiff has no incentive to re-
ject the presumptive award unless the expected recovery ex-
ceeds $35,000, and a defendant never has an incentive to reject 
the presumptive award (since it will be cheaper to pay the pre-
sumptive $15,000 than to incur $20,000 in legal expenses).100 
Given these numbers, an objection to this approach emerg-
es. Plaintiffs in some cases (those in which the expected dam-
ages exceed $35,000) have an incentive to reject the presump-
tive award, while the defendant never does. That fact suggests 
that the defendant will be required to pay too much; it will pay 
$15,000 to most claimants, but more than $35,000 to those who 
reject the presumptive award and successfully prove their enti-
tlement to a higher award. As a consequence, the defendant 
will be overdeterred. 
This concern arises only in positive-value cases (in which 
class certification is often difficult for other reasons),101 and only 
when neither subclassing nor a similar technique is capable of 
preventing upside outliers. Even here, the problem is confined 
to those cases in which the presumptive award (say, $15,000) is 
less than the combined costs to plaintiff and defendant of an 
individual trial (say, $20,000). Moreover, within this subset of 
cases, if the number of outliers is small, the cost savings from 
not expending $20,000 in litigation expenses in each avoided 
individual trial may well exceed the occasional excessive com-
pensation that the defendant must pay.102 Therefore, this 
 
 100. In this analysis I assume that both parties will incur the full $10,000 
in expenses; in other words, the case will not settle short of trial. I do not 
mean to suggest that the cost-shifting approach must be joined with the first 
approach, which made individual trial mandatory. Under the cost-shifting ap-
proach, the party rejecting the presumptive award must pay all further ex-
penses incurred by both sides, whether the claim terminates in a settlement or 
a trial. If the parties settle short of trial, then the costs that the rejecting party 
must bear are only a portion of $10,000. 
 101. See supra note 95. 
 102. Recall that, in economic terms, the goal of a legal system is to reduce 
the sum of accident costs, accident avoidance costs, and administrative costs 
TIDMARSH_4fmt 4/10/2015  11:48 AM 
2015] RESURRECTING TRIAL BY STATISTICS 1491 
 
overdeterrence problem is greater in theory than it is likely to 
be in practice. But I acknowledge the seeming unfairness of a 
system that appears to work as a one-way ratchet favoring 
plaintiffs and exposing defendants to the risk of excessive de-
terrence. One way to even up the seeming disparity is to elimi-
nate cost shifting when the defendant proves that it is not lia-
ble to an individual plaintiff. Drawing the cost-shifting line 
when the defendant prevails on liability is not irrational.103 
To be clear, however, it is not evident that adding this re-
finement to the cost-shifting approach is useful—especially giv-
en the narrow range of cases in which overdeterrence is a con-
cern. The refinement also has the undesirable effect of 
providing defendants with an additional incentive to reject a 
presumptive award; it thus may encourage some of the strate-
gic behavior that the pure cost-shifting approach avoids. But if 
a court is worried about overdeterrence, denying cost shifting 
in cases in which the defendants are not liable is a better solu-
tion than a system that rejects presumptive judgments and 
leaves plaintiffs to the vagaries of whatever other enforcement 
mechanisms they can employ. 
With or without the exclusion of cost shifting when the de-
fendant prevails on liability, the cost-shifting approach is sub-
ject to a substantial criticism: it creates an exception to the 
“American rule,” under which each party bears its own costs,104 
and invokes a “loser-pays” rule (or “English rule”) that non-U.S. 
legal systems adopt.105 Thus, cost shifting seems out of step 
with the ordinary approach to fees used in American litigation. 
 
(such as legal expenses), and that legal costs consist both of error costs and 
direct litigation expenses. See supra note 21. Any excessive compensation that 
results from cost shifting is an error cost, which is nonetheless worth incurring 
as long as the cost is less than the error costs associated with the strategic be-
havior that would occur in the absence of cost shifting plus the direct litigation 
costs that are avoided due to cost shifting. 
 103. While not irrational, it is also not logically compelled. This approach 
creates a different kind of inequality: plaintiffs who reject the presumptive 
approach must always bear all of the costs of doing so, while defendants bear 
all of the costs only when they are found to be liable. 
 104. E.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 
(1975) (describing the American rule). 
 105. See id.; James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Set-
tlement Under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. 
& ECON. 225, 225, 229 (1995) (“Throughout most of the Western world the 
English rule applies, and the losing party in a dispute is liable for the winner’s 
legal fees, up to a reasonable limit.”); Edward F. Sherman, Transnational Per-
spectives Regarding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
510, 523 (2006) (“[M]ost of the world follows the ‘loser pays’ standard.”). 
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But this criticism will not succeed. The American rule is subject 
to numerous exceptions, both statutory and rule-based.106 A 
particularly pertinent exception is Rule 68, which allows a 
court to shift the defendant’s costs of continuing to litigate a 
case to the plaintiff when the defendant makes an offer to allow 
judgment on specified terms, the plaintiff rejects the offer, and 
“the judgment that the offeree finally obtains is not more fa-
vorable than the unaccepted offer . . . .”107 The cost-shifting idea 
here is analogous if we conceive of the presumptive judgment 
as an offer of judgment. Of course, Rule 68 and presumptive-
judgment cost shifting are not identical: the latter applies 
equally to plaintiffs and defendants,108 and it shifts costs auto-
matically on rejection of the presumptive judgment rather than 
in situations in which the judgment is less favorable than the 
offer. Both of these differences are necessary to prevent the 
parties from engaging in strategic behavior that would under-
mine the effectiveness of presumptive judgments.109 
 
 106. For a handful of these provisions, see supra note 99. For a more com-
prehensive list, see HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94-970, AWARDS 
OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES BY FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERAL AGENCIES (2008) 
(listing approximately 200 fee-shifting statutes and other exceptions to the 
American rule, including common law provisions and procedural rules). 
 107. FED. R. CIV. P. 68(d). 
 108. By its terms, Rule 68 comes into play only when “a party defending 
against a claim . . . serve[s] on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on 
specified terms . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 68(a). 
 109. Rule 68’s application only to plaintiffs who reject an offer of judgment 
has long been criticized. See, e.g., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 339, 361–67 (1983) (propos-
ing amendments that would have made Rule 68 equally applicable to plaintiffs 
and defendants); Edward F. Sherman & Christopher M. Fairman, Interplay 
Between Mediation and Offer of Judgment Rule Sanctions, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 327, 333 (2011) (“By limiting the application to defendants, Fed-
eral Rule 68 prohibits the potential benefits of its provisions from an entire 
class of litigant—plaintiffs.”). If presumptive-judgment cost shifting were simi-
larly applied only to plaintiffs, defendants have a reason to act strategically in 
rejecting the presumptive award, thus defeating much of the good that pre-
sumptive judgments can do. Likewise, allowing a party to avoid cost shifting 
as long as the ultimate award is more favorable to that party in absolute dol-
lars (for instance, not requiring cost shifting when the presumptive award is 
$15,000, and either a rejecting plaintiff receives $15,001 or a rejecting defen-
dant is ordered to pay $14,999) gives both parties too much room to act strate-
gically. A common purpose behind both Rule 68 and presumptive averaging—
to foster settlement rather than litigation—is better advanced in the latter 
case by making the cost shift automatic. That is especially true because pre-
sumptive averaging has an important secondary purpose—to make feasible 
the aggregation needed to achieve a proper level of deterrence—that is better 
realized through automatic cost shifting. 
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The existence of cost shifting will affect the parties’ behav-
ior in a salutary fashion. As a general matter, a loser-pays (or 
cost-shifting) regime creates an incentive to assert claims that 
are more likely to prevail, while the American rule creates an 
incentive to bring claims of less certain merit.110 Thus, shifting 
costs to the party who rejects the presumptive award means 
that the party likely will accept the presumptive award unless 
the party has a high likelihood of proving an entitlement to a 
higher award (in the case of a plaintiff) or a lower award (in the 
case of a defendant).111 In contrast to the usual criticism of the 
loser-pays rule—that it discourages the filing of meritorious but 
risky claims112—discouraging the pursuit of individual claims 
leaves the presumptive award in place. Presumptive-judgment 
cost shifting does not thwart enforcement of meritorious claims. 
Rather, the point of cost shifting is to discourage socially 
costly litigation.113 The sample trials have already established 
the level of compensation that leads to optimal deterrence and 
are presumptively accurate.114 From a social-utility perspective, 
individual trials should occur only when the gains from addi-
tional accuracy exceed the costs of achieving that level of accu-
racy.115 In order to ensure that individual trials occur only in 
 
 110. See Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, Litigation and Legal Evolu-
tion: Does Procedure Matter?, 152 PUB. CHOICE 181, 196–98 (2012) (analyzing 
incentives to litigate claims of uncertain merit under the loser-pays and Amer-
ican rules); see also Hughes & Snyder, supra note 105, at 229 (discussing the 
effects of fee shifting on claim quality). 
 111. A “higher” award is one in which the plaintiff’s marginal gain from the 
individual award (computed as the difference between the value of the indi-
vidual award and the value of the rejected presumptive award) exceeds the 
joint additional costs of litigating the individual claim. A “lower” award is one 
in which the defendant’s marginal gain from the individual award (computed 
as the difference between the value of the rejected presumptive award and the 
value of the individual award) exceeds the joint additional costs of litigating 
the individual claim. 
 112. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths 
to a “Better Way”: Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation Background 
Paper, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 888 (noting that the English Rule “may excessive-
ly discourage the pressing of plausible but not clearly winning claims, particu-
larly when the prospective plaintiffs are strongly risk averse”). 
 113. See, e.g., id. at 887–91. 
 114. See supra notes 21–28 and accompanying text. 
 115. See supra notes 21, 46–47 and accompanying text (discussing the in-
terconnections in the economic analysis of due process and trial by statistics); 
cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 343–48 (1976) (holding, in part, 
that the Due Process Clause permits departures from the adversarial process 
when the savings in litigation expense exceed the expected loss in the accuracy 
of the judgment). 
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this circumstance, the party seeking to depart from the pre-
sumptive award must fully internalize all the costs of its deci-
sion to reject the award. 
This analysis, however, assumes that the parties are risk-
neutral and operate with perfect information—in other words, 
that they will make the correct decision about accepting or re-
jecting the presumptive award. The following section examines 
the validity of these assumptions. 
4. Risk Preference and Imperfect Information  
The presumptive-judgment approach assumes that the 
parties can make accurate decisions to accept or reject pre-
sumptive awards. Any distortions in the capacity of the parties 
to do so can affect the validity of the procedure. Two principal 
sources of potential distortion are excessive risk taking or risk 
avoidance on the one hand, and imperfect information about 
the expected value of the individual claims on the other. 
With respect to risk, the main concern is risk taking. If the 
parties are mutually risk-averse, they will underestimate their 
chances in individual litigation, and will opt for the certainty of 
the presumptive award. Therefore, mutual risk aversion cuts 
down on individual litigation, and does not raise the specter of 
an excessive number of individual claims.116 Risk taking, on the 
other hand, can have the opposite effect. A party may be undu-
ly optimistic about its chances in individual litigation, and re-
ject a presumptive award that it should accept. As a result, the 
marginal gains from enhanced accuracy are likely to be less 
than the costs of the individual proceeding, causing a net social 
loss. 
Although risk taking may be a concern with some class ac-
tions, it is not an objection that should derail presumptive 
judgments across the board. In most negative-value class ac-
tions, not even the most risk-loving plaintiff will reject a pre-
sumptive award of $20 when the maximum possible award is 
$100 and it would cost $20,000 ($10,000 each for the plaintiff’s 
costs and the defendant’s costs) to obtain that award; the same 
is true of the defendant when a defense victory is achievable 
 
 116. Less individual litigation is not socially beneficial if the cost of litiga-
tion is less than the marginal increase in accuracy. As long as the parties are 
mutually risk-averse, however, it is likely that both plaintiffs and defendants 
failed to contest some awards that they should have, so that the effect of risk 
aversion somewhat washes out. 
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only at an expense of $20,000.117 Even in positive-value class ac-
tions, the spectrum of risk preferences across class members 
means that risk-averse and risk-taking behaviors are likely to 
cancel out; some class members won’t litigate when they should 
(the risk avoiders), and others will litigate when they shouldn’t 
(the risk takers).118 Although the defendant’s preference to take 
risk (and thus to reject the presumptive award more often than 
it should) may be more fixed, from a macroeconomic viewpoint 
the risk-avoiding preference of some defendants in some cases 
should be an adequate corrective to the risk-taking preferences 
of other defendants in other cases. Furthermore, victims and 
injurers generally tend to avoid risk,119 so concerns about the 
social cost of excessive risk taking are misplaced. Finally, the 
results of the sample trials should inject a degree of realism in-
to the calculations of parties that might otherwise be unduly 
optimistic about their prospects at trial. 
Relatedly, informational deficiencies can make it difficult 
for parties to make socially beneficial litigation decisions. In 
particular, in order for presumptive judgments to work, a party 
deciding whether to accept or reject a presumptive award must 
calculate the net expected value of an individual claim. To 
make a correct assessment, the party and its lawyer must have 
accurate information about the probability of recovery, the 
quantum of recovery if the claim is successful, and the cost of 
achieving that outcome.120 To the extent that errors in these 
 
 117. I am assuming that the party who rejects the award must pay the rea-
sonable costs of both sides in litigating the award individually; otherwise, a 
risk-taking defendant could have an incentive to challenge individual awards 
if it believes that doing so will keep other plaintiffs from asserting claims. See 
supra Part II.B.3. 
 118. This is not true when the claims are highly homogenous, so that no 
claimant has a claim whose expected value exceeds the presumptive judgment 
by enough to justify the cost of litigation. In this situation, risk aversion only 
reinforces the correct decision not to litigate individually, while those who are 
risk takers may impose social costs by litigating individual claims that they 
should not. To the extent that the costs of risk aversion and risk taking do not 
cancel each other out, the costs are part of the price that society pays for the 
right of individuals to contest the fact and amount of injury. See supra notes 
58–64 and accompanying text. 
 119. See Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Third-Party Financed Litiga-
tion, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 701, 708 (2012) (“In many real-world settings the 
victim and the injurer will be risk-averse.”); Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to 
Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1408–16 
(2003) (reviewing literature suggesting that plaintiffs are often risk averse, 
but defendants may sometimes be risk neutral in large-scale litigation). 
 120. In other words, plaintiffs and defendants need to know the values of 
the variables set out in the respective formulas in Part II.A. 
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calculations induce a party to accept a presumptive award, they 
are less troublesome because the errors eliminate individual 
trials.121 But recent work has shown that the opposite problem 
may be more prevalent: lawyers are subject to cognitive illu-
sions that often lead them to reject settlements and prolong lit-
igation.122 
Once again, informational difficulties operate over a fairly 
narrow range of class actions. In a negative-value class action, 
parties and their lawyers are unlikely to make informational 
mistakes of such a magnitude that they become convinced that 
a claim with an objective value of $100 is worth litigating at an 
objective cost of $20,000. In both negative-value and positive-
value cases, the parties are not in the position that ordinary lit-
igants and lawyers are in, because they already possess signifi-
cant information about the value of their claims. One of the 
benefits of presumptive judgments is that parties have a group 
of similar cases—the sample verdicts used to calculate the pre-
sumptive award—against which they can measure their expec-
tations.123 Granted, parties and their lawyers may see distinc-
tions between the sample results and their specific case that 
make other cases an imperfect guide to the expected value of 
their claim, but prior verdicts should establish guideposts that 
frame their decision. Remaining errors may wash out, as par-
ties and their lawyers will be too optimistic about some claims 
(and thus try cases they should not) and too pessimistic about 
others (and thus not try cases that they should). To the extent 
that the errors do not wash out, the costs of those errors are at-
tributable to the felt social need that caused the rejection of tri-
al by statistics in its pure form: the desire to give parties the 
opportunity to contest whether and to what extent each indi-
vidual was harmed.124 
In short, risk preferences and informational limitations 
may cause some suboptimal decisions that may lead to more 
individual trials and more cost than the ideal. As the use of the 
word “may” (twice) in the last sentence shows, it is not evident 
that a system of presumptive averaging will invariably result 
 
 121. As described supra note 116, a reduction in individual trials may 
make a system of presumptive judgment work better, but fewer trials is not 
necessarily socially optimal; sometimes the marginal gains in accuracy out-
weigh the cost of trial. 
 122. Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Intuitions 
Prolong Litigation, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 576–80 (2013). 
 123. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 124. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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in excessive trials. There are compensating factors—such as 
the risk aversion of most parties, the availability of the infor-
mation supplied by sample verdicts, the prevalence of negative-
value claims in class-action practice, and the wash-out effect 
that occurs when risk preferences or informational limitations 
lead some parties not to try claims that should be tried—that 
minimize this concern. 
5. Political Legitimacy 
A final concern is whether a court can establish a system of 
presumptive judgments on its own or must instead await legis-
lation. Two of the critiques of the pure trial-by-statistics ap-
proach—that it violated Erie and the Rules Enabling Act125—
boil down to the claim that trial by statistics works a change in 
substantive law that federal courts lack the institutional com-
petence to make. Is the same true of the modified system that I 
have called presumptive judgments? 
The answer breaks into two parts. First, as a general mat-
ter, the answer is that presumptive judgments do not present 
the political-legitimacy problems that trial by statistics did. 
The critical difference between the two is the ability of the par-
ties in the system of presumptive judgments to contest the av-
erage award. This is no small matter, for the damning feature 
of trial by statistics was the inability of parties to prove that a 
particular claimant suffered no injury or suffered an injury dif-
ferent in amount from the average.126 With presumptive judg-
ments, parties retain the fundamental substantive right to con-
test the fact and quantum of injury. The parties may choose not 
to exercise that right; the expected costs of trying an individual 
claim may outweigh the gains of doing so. But providing choice 
does not amount to an abridgment of a substantive right. As 
the Supreme Court recently observed, “the fact that it is not 
worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does 
not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that reme-
dy.”127 
Creating presumptions to aid the resolution of disputes is 
part and parcel of the traditional judicial function.128 Over the 
 
 125. See supra notes 52–58 and accompanying text. 
 126. See supra notes 40, 58–66 and accompanying text. 
 127. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013). 
 128. See generally J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Pre-
sumptions, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 907 (1992) (arguing that a broad system of pre-
sumptions can mediate between a system of rules and a system of discretion, 
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years courts have created hundreds of presumptions.129 Many 
are factual in nature; human experience has shown that when 
fact A is true, it is likely that fact B is also true. Hence, courts 
establish the presumption that, when a party proves fact A, the 
jury can presume fact B (in the absence of contrary evidence).130 
Other presumptions blend factual and legal conclusions; when 
fact A is true, then legal consequence C can also be presumed to 
be true (in the absence of contrary evidence). For instance, a 
blood alcohol level of .10% can create a presumption that the 
driver was operating the car under the influence;131 similarly, in 
a securities case, a court can presume that the shareholder 
with the largest financial stake in the case should be the class 
representative.132 Presumptive judgments act like this latter 
type of presumption; from the facts that (1) the defendant’s ac-
tion was wrongful toward people in the same position as the 
plaintiff and (2) the average harm suffered by a representative 
subset of similarly situated plaintiffs was $15,000, for instance, 
the court presumes that this plaintiff was injured in the 
amount of $15,000. 
Presumptive averaging is the weakest form of presump-
tion, for it goes away as soon as a party contests it.133 Given 
 
capturing the benefits of each system with fewer drawbacks). 
 129. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 5122.1 (“[T]he common law rec-
ognized scores of such presumptions.”); id. § 5125 (providing a non-exhaustive 
list of more than 200 presumptions). 
 130. Courts regard some “presumptions” as “conclusive” or “irrebuttable” 
even when evidence contrary to the presumption exists. Id. § 5122.1; see also 
id. § 5123.1 n.14 (listing several conclusive presumptions contained in stat-
utes). These devices are not true presumptions, but rather legal fictions de-
signed to achieve certain substantive outcomes for policy reasons. Id. 
§§ 5122.1, 5123.1. The pure trial-by-statistics approach, in which each unsam-
pled plaintiff automatically received the average award, could be understood 
as a type of conclusive presumption. 
 131. Id. § 5122.1. 
 132. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2012). 
 133. On the collapsing nature of the presumption, see supra note 70. The 
effect of most evidentiary presumptions is stronger. The strongest “presump-
tion” (to the extent that it can even be classified as one) is the irrebuttable 
presumption. See supra note 130. When the opponent can rebut a presump-
tion, the presumption typically retains some legal effect: either it allows the 
jury to infer that the presumed fact is true or it switches the burden of persua-
sion to the opponent. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 70, §§ 5122.1, 5122.2 
(discussing theories about the effect of a presumption and the approach of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 301). With presumptive averaging, however, none of 
the stronger effects of the presumption exists. Indeed, a stronger effect is not 
even possible. Because it is not informed of the size of the average award in 
the sampled cases, a jury can make no inference about the value of the present 
case from the result of those cases. 
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that courts have the power to establish stronger presumptions, 
the power to create a weak presumption should raise few legit-
imacy concerns as long as the court has a rational basis for cre-
ating the presumption. And it clearly does. Courts have long 
recognized that they have the authority to foster settlement134 
and efficiently resolve disputes.135 Presumptive judgments are 
designed to meet these goals. 
Indeed, although its solution was not exactly the “pre-
sumptive judgment,” one court obliquely hit upon this idea al-
most twenty-five years ago. In Langley v. Coughlin,136 class 
members alleged that they were being confined in conditions 
and under practices that violated the Constitution. They sought 
injunctive relief to prevent future harm, as well as damages for 
past violations.137 After settling the claims for injunctive relief, 
the court faced the problem of determining the proper compen-
sation for past harm.138 In a report and recommendation that 
the district judge adopted, the magistrate recognized the diffi-
culty of awarding individual damages for past harm, and sug-
gested that one option would be to award per diem damages to 
each prisoner.139 The magistrate also proposed an alternative: 
  Alternatively, the Court could establish a presumptive per diem 
award for each day during which conditions were of a given degree of 
unconstitutional severity and then permit both plaintiffs and defend-
ants to seek a variation—either up or down—for specific class mem-
bers based upon a showing of unique individual circumstances. Very 
 
 134. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 135. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
“should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inex-
pensive determination of every action and proceeding”); FED. R. CIV. P. 
16(c)(2)(A) (granting the judge the case-management power to “formulat[e] 
and simplify[] the issues”); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(L) (granting the judge the 
case-management power to “adopt[] special procedures for managing poten-
tially difficult or protracted actions that may involve . . . unusual proof prob-
lems”); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(P) (granting the judge the case-management 
power to “facilitat[e] in other ways the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposi-
tion of the action”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(1)(A) (granting the judge in a class 
action the power “to prescribe measures to prevent undue repetition or compli-
cation in presenting evidence or argument”). 
 136. Langley v. Coughlin, 715 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 137. Id. at 531. 
 138. Id. More specifically, after settlement of the injunctive claims, the de-
fendants moved, inter alia, to decertify the class. Id. at 551. One of their ar-
guments for decertification was the difficulty the plaintiffs faced in proving 
individual damages. Id. at 557–59. 
 139. Id. at 558.  
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few, if any, class members are likely to be the subject of such a sepa-
rate proceeding . . . .140 
The proposed solution in Langley varies from (and com-
pares unfavorably to) presumptive judgments, principally be-
cause the magistrate apparently intended to determine the per 
diem award without the benefit of random sampling.141 But it is 
noteworthy that neither the magistrate nor the district judge 
questioned their power to create a presumption. Given the 
courts’ discretionary power to calculate the quantum of damag-
es in complex cases,142 the power to create a presumptive award 
seems unassailable. 
The second part of the legitimacy question concerns the 
power of a court to order cost shifting onto the party that con-
tests a presumptive award. Although there are many excep-
tions to the American rule,143 nearly all are either statutory or 
embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which have 
been subjected to a rulemaking process under authority dele-
gated by Congress.144 A small reserve of inherent judicial power 
to order one party to pay another party’s costs exists, but it is 
not clear that this power reaches the situation presented by 
presumptive judgments.145 
Of course, the American rule is itself judge-made, and 
therefore subject to judicial modification.146 In other contexts 
judges have creatively modified the ordinary rules for attor-
ney’s fees to meet the needs of complex litigation.147 They also 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 557–58. 
 142. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra notes 104, 106 and accompanying text. 
 144. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–74 (2012) (describing the scope of the delega-
tion to the Supreme Court and the rulemaking process). 
 145. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991) (holding that a 
court has the inherent power to sanction a party for bad-faith conduct, even 
when some of the same conduct might be sanctionable under federal statutes 
or the Federal Rules, but noting that a court must “exercise caution in invok-
ing its inherent power”). 
 146. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257–
60 (1975) (describing the history and origin of the modern American rule). 
 147. See, e.g., Vincent v. Hughes Air W., Inc., 557 F.2d 759, 769–72 (9th 
Cir. 1977) (applying the “common fund doctrine,” under which “a private 
plaintiff, or his attorney, whose efforts create, discover, increase or preserve a 
fund to which others also have a claim is entitled to recover from the fund the 
costs of his litigation, including attorneys’ fees,” to award lead counsel fees in a 
class action); cf. Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action 
Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 
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possess a loosely defined reservoir of case-management power 
from which cost shifting might be teased out.148 In short, it is at 
least debatable that a judge could order cost shifting as part of 
a presumptive-judgment scheme. 
The prudent course, however, is to enact legislation or to go 
through the rulemaking process to invest courts with this cost-
shifting power. The American rule is so deeply embedded in the 
structure of American litigation that alterations are best made 
through a process that provides more political legitimacy than 
a common-law pronouncement—at least at the federal level.149 
Because cost shifting is a linchpin of the presumptive-judgment 
process,150 the fate of the process may hinge on legislative will 
or judicial rulemaking. 
But if a legislature or judicial-rulemaking body is willing to 
go this far, would it not make sense for that body to go the ex-
tra step and enact the system for which presumptive judgments 
are a second-best solution: trial by statistics? Not necessarily. 
Trial by statistics is a more radical, and therefore less political-
ly palatable, solution because it denies individuals the ability to 
contest issues of causation and damages.151 For this reason, tri-
al by statistics also constitutes a shift in the underlying sub-
stantive law, thus arguably putting it beyond the reach of judi-
cial rulemaking.152 Presumptive judgments, even with a cost-
shifting component, do not raise the same concerns. True, shift-
ing costs has an effect on the scope of substantive rights. But 
the same is true of every procedural rule.153 An effect on sub-
stantive rights, in and of itself, does not delegitimize either cost 
 
VAND. L. REV. 107, 109–11 (2010) (recognizing, but questioning, the present 
application of the doctrine in multidistrict cases). 
 148. For the likeliest textual sources of this case-management power, see 
supra note 135. See also In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 822 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009) (“District judges must have authority to manage their dockets, es-
pecially during massive litigation . . . .”). 
 149. The same analysis need not pertain in a state in which the state 
courts enjoy broader authority to tailor legal processes to the needs of specific 
forms of litigation. 
 150. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 151. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 152. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012) (requiring that Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure “not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right”). 
 153. See Bone, supra note 22, at 909 (“Even the early twentieth-century 
reformers understood that procedure affects outcome.”); Jay Tidmarsh, Proce-
dure, Substance, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 877, 891 (2011) (“[E]very ‘proce-
dural’ rule changes entitlements and values of claims . . . .”). 
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shifting in general or presumptive judgments in particular.154 
Presumptive averaging should attract legislators and judicial 
rulemakers who are interested in finding a compromise that 
captures many of the benefits of trial by statistics while impos-
ing none of its side effects on the scope of substantive rights. 
C. THE CASE FOR PRESUMPTIVE JUDGMENTS 
Having fleshed out some necessary practical aspects of the 
proposal, I turn to the broader argument for presumptive 
judgments. Until now, I have made a series of smaller argu-
ments to set the contours of presumptive judgments and evalu-
ate objections to these contours. The picture that has emerged 
is that of a second-best alternative to trial by statistics, made 
necessary by a legal world in which the parties’ right to contest 
the fact of injury (causation) and the amount of injury (damag-
es) is sacrosanct. In such a world, trial by statistics is impossi-
ble, despite the evident deterrence and efficiency gains achiev-
able. Indeed, as the discussion of the practical effects of 
presumptive averaging made clear, presumptive averaging has 
some efficiency and deterrence limitations that pure trial by 
statistics does not: a substantial number of outliers may make 
the process unworkable for positive-value claims, some strate-
gic behavior in rejecting the presumptions may occur, and risk 
preferences and informational limitations may lead to some so-
cially undesirable decisions to contest (or not contest) the pre-
sumptive award.155 As I have emphasized, these costs are a nec-
essary consequence of protecting the right of individuals to 
submit individualized proof on causation and damages. As long 
as a class action using presumptive judgments yields more net 
social benefit than other class actions or dispute-resolution 
mechanisms,156 these costs are worth incurring, and a presump-
tive-judgment process is worth adopting. 
But arguing only that a presumptive-judgment process is 
the most efficient mechanism available, all things considered, 
undersells its strength. Certainly a part of the argument for 
presumptive averaging is its capacity to capture some of the ef-
 
 154. Cf. Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 
533, 553 (1991) (“Imposing monetary sanctions on parties that violate . . . 
[Rule 11] may confer a benefit on other litigants, but the Rules Enabling Act is 
not violated by such incidental effects on substantive rights.”). 
 155. See supra Parts II.B.1–3. 
 156. On the foundational nature of this assumption to a system of pre-
sumptive judgments, see supra note 71. 
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ficiency gains that trial by statistics had promised. Except on 
efficiency grounds, however, trial by statistics was a deeply 
flawed concept. It provided inaccurate compensation to many of 
the unsampled class members, and it gave neither those mem-
bers nor the defendant an opportunity to participate in the pro-
cess of determining the proper relief due in individual cases.157 
It pushed the scope of judicial power to alter substantive rights 
to (and possibly beyond) the permissible limit, and it arguably 
infringed on constitutional norms for due process and jury tri-
al.158 Presumptive averaging, which provides parties with the 
opportunity to obtain accurate individual recoveries at trial, 
fares far better on all of these scores. 
More generally, procedural arguments tend to fall into one 
of three camps: an efficiency camp, a rights-based camp, and a 
process camp.159 The efficiency approach seeks to minimize the 
sum of litigation and error costs; the rights-based approach 
emphasizes the accurate enforcement of individual substantive 
rights; and the process camp emphasizes values such as auton-
omy, participation, and dignity.160 Although disagreeing over 
the nature of a proper outcome, the first two theories are both 
consequentialist (or outcome-centered); the third is deontologi-
cal (or process-centered). 
Presumptive averaging broadly appeals to all three ration-
ales. Given that trial by statistics is off the table, presumptive 
averaging is the least costly way to resolve the dispute—for the 
simple reason that it is to be used only when it is least costly.161 
Thus, it satisfies the efficiency model. 
Presumptive averaging also does not discourage the en-
forcement of individual rights. It establishes a presumptive 
award, but it permits individuals the freedom to prove that 
they are entitled to pay or receive a different recovery. Of 
course, the economics of presumptive judgments (especially 
given cost shifting to the party who chooses to contest the pre-
sumption) may dictate that the parties accept the presumptive 
award rather than press on to obtain a more accurate individu-
 
 157. See supra Part I.B. 
 158. See supra Parts I.B–C. 
 159. See Bone, supra note 22, at 919; see also Lawrence B. Solum, Proce-
dural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 191 (2004) (positing three models of ad-
judication: an accuracy model, a balancing (or efficiency) model, and a partici-
pation model). 
 160. See Bone, supra note 22, at 919. 
 161. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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al award. But that reality is always present in a world of costly 
procedure. The costliness of procedure inhibits a plaintiff with 
a valid $500 claim from bringing suit to vindicate the right. The 
costliness and uncertainty of procedure likewise induce parties 
to settle their claims rather than try them to their conclusion.162 
Under a rights-based theory, the goal of procedure should be to 
keep these costs to a minimum, in order to obtain the most en-
forcement possible, while still providing a forum to determine 
the validity of claims for all those willing to endure any remain-
ing costs. Under presumptive judgments, parties who are will-
ing to pay for the privilege are able to obtain an individualized 
assessment of their claims or defenses.163 The presumptive-
judgment process no more discourages the exercise of that priv-
ilege than any process that uses the loser-pays rule. 
For the same reasons, presumptive judgments do not di-
rectly offend non-instrumental values such as participation, 
dignity, autonomy, or equality. Parties retain the right to par-
ticipate in individual litigation; they are not required to accept 
the presumptive award. Of course, the presumptive award, 
when combined with cost shifting, creates an inducement not to 
litigate, but the same is true of many presumptions that seek to 
discourage litigation on certain matters.164 Attempting to influ-
ence an autonomous individual’s choice not to use a social re-
source (such as a court system) unless a social benefit exists is 
not a violation of the party’s autonomy when the individual re-
mains free to pay for the privilege of using the resource. Like-
wise, presumptive judgments start with the proposition of 
equal treatment for all class members, but allow the parties the 
opportunity to assert relevant differences. Like cases are treat-
ed alike, but the parties retain the power to prove that some 
cases are unalike. 
The only process-based concern arises indirectly—from the 
effect of presumptive averaging when its use allows a court to 
certify a class that otherwise would not have been certified.165 A 
person who believes that class actions invariably violate rights 
of participation or autonomy might thus object to any process 
 
 162. See Shavell, supra note 76, at 63–69 (describing how risk-neutral par-
ties make settlement valuations based on expected value and the costs of liti-
gation). 
 163. See supra Part II.A. 
 164. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 106, at 1, 61. 
 165. On the way in which the process might have an impact at the class-
certification stage, see supra notes 5–13 and accompanying text. 
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that “improves” class actions in a way that made them more 
readily usable.166 Even here, the argument would need to be 
limited to positive-value cases; in negative-value cases class ac-
tions do not violate any significant interests in participation or 
autonomy for the simple reason that the class members would 
never have sued individually.167 Whatever the precise breadth 
of the autonomy critique, a presumptive-judgment process 
must plead guilty to this particular charge: its effect is indeed 
to make class or other mass aggregation a more viable alterna-
tive. 
On balance, presumptive averaging fares well under the 
standard arguments made to justify procedural devices. It is 
admittedly a pragmatic solution, not perfect from any perspec-
tive. From an efficiency perspective, trial by statistics is better, 
but that device in its pure form is dead and unlikely to return. 
From a rights-based perspective, presumptive judgments are 
not as desirable as individual adjudication. But in the real 
world individual adjudication can be enormously costly. The 
choice will often be between imperfect presumptive judgments 
and no adjudication at all; in light of that reality, presumptive 
judgments, with their reservation of the right to pursue indi-
vidual litigation that the parties are willing to pay for, satisfies 
the rights-based approach. For similar reasons, presumptive 
averaging does a decent, albeit imperfect, job of respecting the 
rights of autonomy, participation, and equality. 
As a pragmatic solution, presumptive judgments are sub-
ject to the criticism that they fail to be faithful to any single 
theory of procedure. In procedure, however, such pragmatic 
balancing is common,168 especially because no theory of proce-
 
 166. For an extended critique of class actions principally on autonomy 
grounds, see MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 125–34, 140–
75 (2009). For another critique of class actions due to their limited capacity to 
vindicate participatory principles, but ultimately concluding that class actions 
with limited participatory rights (or, in some instances with no participatory 
rights) can be appropriate, see Solum, supra note 159, at 313–20. 
 167. See REDISH, supra note 166, at 172 (recognizing that opt-out negative-
value class actions may be permissible when the small claim value renders 
“the constitutional interest in litigant autonomy . . . de minimis”). But Profes-
sor Redish would not permit negative-value class actions when the amount at 
stake is so small that putative class members would not even bother to file a 
claim. Id. at 131–32. In his view, these “bounty hunter” suits, which benefit 
only the lawyers, are functionally qui tam actions unauthorized by statute. Id.  
 168. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (establishing a bal-
ancing test for analyzing issues under the Due Process Clause); cf. FED. R. 
CIV. P. 1 (stating that the goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is “to 
TIDMARSH_4fmt 4/10/2015  11:48 AM 
1506 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1459 
 
dure has yet won the heart and mind of all. How we do things 
(process) should matter, but what we achieve (substance) also 
should matter.169 Even when these considerations do not lead to 
the choice of a single correct procedural rule, our obligation is 
to make “choices . . . on reasoning that we can reflectively sus-
tain if we subject them to critical scrutiny.”170 Presumptive 
judgments are precisely that sort of solution. 
  CONCLUSION   
Using a presumptive-judgment approach would not have 
saved the Wal-Mart class action, which suffered from defects 
unrelated to the difficulty of calculating class members’ indi-
vidual damages.171 Nor is the technique appropriate for every 
class action seeking damages. While it is no panacea for every-
thing that ails class actions, presumptive judgments can be 
useful when the difficulty of calculating individual damages is 
the sticking point in class certification and when, in addition, 
the parties have little financial incentive to contest the applica-
tion of the presumptive award to individual claims. In this 
modified form, trial by statistics should enjoy a long and fruit-
ful life. 
 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding”). 
 169. Cf. AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 20–23, 208–17 (2009) (devel-
oping a “comprehensive outcome” theory of justice, in which both methods and 
outcomes are relevant considerations). 
 170. Id. at 180. 
 171. A majority of the Court found that the class action failed to meet the 
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 
S. Ct. 2541, 2550–57 (2011), and the Court unanimously held that Rule 
23(b)(2) could not be used as a vehicle for obtaining damages, id. at 2557–61. 
